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I. INTRODUCTION
Lawmakers use law not only to order and empower, but to exhort and persuade.
To paraphrase Richard E. Neustadt, the power to make law is no greater than the
power to persuade people to comply with it.1 This Article introduces a new concept
of law’s motivational functions and the laws that serve those functions, which I call
“motivational law.”2 One law may possess the function of motivating people to
comply with another law. Even laws that are not primarily motivational frequently
are couched in exhortative or persuasive rhetoric to increase compliance, or to give
the impression that they will have that effect.
Motivational law is found in the requirement of consideration for contract
formation, obscenity laws, censorship laws, religious laws on diet, dress and ritual,
military regulations, and in a host of other contexts. Even due process has a
motivational function. Rules of procedure may or may not result in just outcomes,
but the appearance of fairness with which they clothe the judicial system motivates
citizens to accept those outcomes and obey judicial orders.3
“Soft law”4 lies at the heart of New Governance5 theory, and it, too, is
1
RICHARD E. NEUSTADT, PRESIDENTIAL POWER: THE POLICIES OF LEADERSHIP 10 (John
Wiley & Sons 4th ed., Columbia Univ. 1960). (Presidential power is the “power to persuade . .
. .”). Alexander Bickel made a similar comment on the power of the judiciary. A court
opinion, like poetry, he said, “makes nothing happen.” ALEXANDER M. BICKEL, THE LEAST
DANGEROUS BRANCH 245.(Yale Univ. Press 2nd ed. 1962).
2

The concept of motivational law builds on ideas in my book on Jewish liturgical law and
practice, ARNOLD S. ROSENBERG, JEWISH LITURGY AS A SPIRITUAL SYSTEM (1997). In the
book I explored the motivational purposes of Jewish liturgy and ritual, and the historical and
textual evidence of those purposes. I wish to thank my colleagues Eric Mitnick, Linda Keller
and the other members of the Junior Faculty Writing Group at Thomas Jefferson School of
Law for their helpful comments on earlier drafts of this article.
3

See TOM R. TYLER, WHY PEOPLE OBEY THE LAW (1990).

4

“In its broadest scope, the formula `soft law’ labels those regulatory instruments and
mechanisms of governance that, while implicating some kind of normative commitment, do
not rely on binding rules or a regime of formal sanctions.” Anna Di Robilant, Genealogies of
Soft Law, 54 AM. J. COMP. L. 499, 499 (2006). “Advocates of soft law claim that social
integration is best effected through multilevel decentralized processes resulting in open-ended
and flexible guidelines and standards. Conversely, defenders of hard law insist that social
policies must be pursued through a centralized, vertical and formal decision-making process
yielding uniform and binding rules creating justiciable rights.” Id. at 505. See also Louise G.
Trubek, Public Interest Lawyers and New Governance: Advocating for Health Care, 2002
WIS. L. REV. 575, 600 (2002) (“Soft law is a term used to refer to guidelines,
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motivational law. People are more likely to be motivated to comply with rules that
govern their conduct if those rules are formulated with their participation and
enforced by persuasion rather than threats.6 If a spoonful of sugar makes the
medicine of regulation go down, a rule that compels a regulator to administer that
spoonful of sugar, or a principle that exhorts the regulated to swallow it, is
motivational law.
Motivational law sometimes lacks a clear connection to its intended impact on
compliance, and the disconnect may cause societal tension. Social scientists never
found a clear connection between obscenity laws and compliance with laws against
rape and sexual abuse.7 Numerous efforts by social scientists to prove that religious
motivational laws (e.g., “go to church on Sunday”) motivate people to comply with
laws against crimes involving violence or dishonesty have produced inconsistent
results. As discussed further in this Article, to the extent motivational law succeeds
in motivating compliance with other laws, that success frequently depends on peer
group influence.
Motivational law has a dark side. It possesses an inherently conservative
tendency that aids regimes and other authorities in asserting their power and resisting
legal and social change. However, those who challenge a regime or authority may
set up a competing motivational law. Conflicting motivational laws frequently mark
the fault lines of legal and social conflict.
After defining the concept of motivational law and giving several examples in
Parts II.A and II.B, I discuss in Part II.C how motivational law fits into theories of
law. In Part II.D, I explore the boundaries of motivational law and what it means to
say that a law is “motivational.” Part III.A examines motivational law as a type of
intrinsic social control, and Part III.B explains how motivational law works through
moral community-building, naming and shaming, cognitive dissonance and cognitive
biases. Part IV.A asks why motivational law often fails, IV.B looks at the equivocal
evidence of the efficacy of religious motivational law in preventing delinquency, and
in IV.C I take a look on the dark side at the sad instances where motivational law
recommendations, policy suggestions, and other government systems designed to influence
behavior without imposing formal legal obligations.”).
5

See infra note 12.

6

This is what Orly Lobel seems to mean when she asserts that “`soft’ does not mean
`voluntary.’” Orly Lobel, Surreply: Setting the Agenda for New Governance Research, 89
MINN. L. REV. 498, 506 (2004). If an environmental regulatory agency obtains the
participation of regulated businesses in formulating pollution control regulations, the resulting
rules will be easier to enforce without the need for time-consuming and costly coercive action
by the government, though coercive measures would still be available as a last resort. See
Errol Meidinger, Competitive Supra-Governmental Regulation: How Can It Be Democratic?,
at 3 (July 26, 2007) (unpublished paper presented at the Annual Meeting of the Law and
Society Association, Berlin, Germany) (on file with the author) (“One of the most striking
developments in supra-governmental regulation has been the broad and continuous expansion
of participation and transparency, although both remain subject to improvement. Most
programs now provide for multi-stakeholder participation, notice and comment processes for
rulemakings and adjudications, public responses to comments and explanations of decisions,
formalized dispute resolution and appeals processes, publication of rules, procedures and
decisions, and so on.”).
7

See infra note 21.
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succeeds, examining how authoritarian regimes and cults use motivational law to
consolidate and preserve their power.
In Part V, I offer a theory of the efficacy of motivational law. Motivational law
improves compliance with regulatory law only if (1) either the motivational law
itself is enforced by sanctions and threat of sanctions sufficiently severe to have a
deterrent impact or the motivational law is consistent with the self-interest of those
being regulated, and (2) the linkage between the motivational law and regulatory law
is evident to those persons who are supposed to comply with the motivational law.
However, lawmakers are drawn to use motivational law by appearance instead of
reality, hence many motivational laws are enacted that work poorly in achieving
compliance. Instead, they tend to exert a conservative influence on social and legal
change.
II. THE CONCEPT OF MOTIVATIONAL LAW
A. Defining Motivational Law
Motivational law consists of those rules and principles,8 a purpose or function of
which is to motivate people to comply with rules and principles that regulate their
conduct toward each other or their environment. I will refer to the latter as
“regulatory” laws. A law is not motivational merely because citizens are enthused
about complying with it. To fit this definition of motivational law, the law must at
least be capable, or regarded as capable, of motivating compliance with a regulatory
law. A regulatory law may be another law or rule that regulates conduct, or it may
be that a single law possesses both motivational and regulatory functions.
For example, the common law requires the formality of consideration to form an
executory contract for multiple reasons, including evidentiary, channeling, and
“cautionary” functions.9 The rule requiring consideration is a regulatory law in its
evidentiary function, but a motivational law to the extent it performs a cautionary
function. If the formality of consideration motivates the parties to be serious about
what they are doing, presumably they will make only those contractual promises that
they are motivated and able to keep.10 Why we should want parties to be motivated
to keep their promises and to avoid making promises if they are not serious is a
matter of efficiency, social policy and, in the view of some, morality, but what is
important here is that the consideration requirement exists in part because of the
assumption—accurate or not11—that it helps to ensure that people will be motivated
to comply with their duties under contract law.
Motivational law in governance is on the rise. New Governance relies on
8

See Part II.C, infra, for discussion of whether motivational law is “law.”

9

Lon L. Fuller, Consideration and Form, 41 COLUM. L. REV. 799, 801 (1941).

10

Id. at 800, 805, 815.

11

See, e.g., Mark B. Wessman, Retraining the Gatekeeper: Further Reflections on the
Doctrine of Consideration, 29 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 713, 828 (1995) (questioning whether the
consideration requirement actually accomplishes its cautionary function); Mark B. Wessman,
Should We Fire the Gatekeeper? An Examination of the Doctrine of Consideration, 48 U.
MIAMI L. REV. 45 (1993); James D. Gordon III, Consideration and the Commercial-Gift
Dichotomy, 44 VAND. L. REV. 283 (1991); James D. Gordon III, A Dialogue About the
Doctrine of Consideration, 75 CORNELL L. REV. 987, 993 (1990).
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increasing motivation to comply as a substitute for traditional command-and-control
structures.12 New Governance and legal pluralist13 theorists reject the classic
Austinian definition of law as a command accompanied by threat of a sanction for
non-compliance,14 and advocate regulation that is cooperative, decentralized or
“orchestrated” among levels of authority, flexible, participatory, and dynamic, and
functions through the identification and pursuit of mutual interests.15 In simpler
terms, governments can achieve higher levels of compliance with regulatory law
through an approach to regulation that is personalized, consistent with social norms
about how people should approach others, does not demean or shame those whose
interests are involved, and gives the stakeholders a sense that they have both a say in
what is to be required and a stake in complying with those requirements. Soft law
exists to increase compliance with regulatory law, and it does so largely by
increasing motivation to comply. Soft law is a form of motivational law.
B. Uses of Motivational Law: Some Examples
1. Obscenity Laws
Modern obscenity laws originated as motivational laws in 17th century England
introduced by the Puritan ecclesiastical courts to induce citizens to comply with
religious prohibitions of immodest behavior. Immodest behavior was prohibited lest
it motivate people to violate religious laws banning extramarital sex.16
The motivational nature of obscenity law persisted in the United States. Anthony
Comstock, founder of the Committee for the Suppression of Vice, whose efforts
resulted in the restrictive Comstock Act of 1873, was a strict Congregationalist who

12
Orly Lobel, The Renew Deal: the Fall of Regulation and the Rise of Governance in
Contemporary Thought, 89 MINN. L. REV. 342 (2004); Bradley C. Karkkainen, “New
Governance” in Legal Thought and in the World: Some Splitting as Antidote to Overzealous
Lumping, 89 MINN. L. REV. 471 (2004); Orly Lobel, Surreply: Setting the Agenda for New
Governance Research, 89 MINN. L. REV. 489 (2004); Bradley C. Karkkainen, Information as
Environmental Regulation: TRI and Performance Benchmarking, Precursor to a New
Paradigm? 89 GEO. L.J. 257 (2001); Joel Handler et al., A Roundtable on New Legal Realism,
Microanalysis of Institutions, and the New Governance: Exploring Convergences and
Differences, 2005 WIS. L. REV. 479 (2005).
13

Legal pluralism embraces non-governmental regulatory orderings as part of “law,” and
the rules of non-governmental organizations that contribute to New Governance include many
with a motivational purpose or function. See Sally Engle Merry, Legal Pluralism, 22 LAW &
SOC’Y REV. 869 (1988); Christine Parker, The Pluralization of Business Regulation, at 5 (July
25, 2007) (unpublished paper given at the Law & Society Association Annual Meeting, Berlin,
Germany) (on file with author); Julia Black, Decentring Regulation: Understanding the Role
of Regulation and Self-Regulation in a “Post-Regulatory” World, 54 CURRENT LEGAL PROBS.
103 (2001); Brian Z. Tamanaha, A Non-Essentialist Version of Legal Pluralism, 27 J. LAW &
SOC’Y. 296 (2000)...
14

See infra p.,74.

15

Lobel, supra note 12, at 348.

16

Mark Conrad, Censorship in America, 10 HUM. RTS. 28, 30 (1982).
previously had been limited to cases of blasphemy and heresy. Id at, 28-30.
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perceived himself as working to enforce God’s law.17 The most powerful pressure
group for film censorship in the United States from the early 1930’s through the
1960’s was the Legion for Decency, a Catholic organization, which established its
own film rating board and pressured the motion picture industry in Hollywood to
enforce its Motion Picture Production Code.18 A “C” rating from the Legion for
Decency “direct[ed] the nation’s 45 million Catholics to avoid the film as they would
avoid any other occasion for sin.’”19
More recently, prominent feminists such as Catherine MacKinnon and Andrea
Dworkin have supported anti-pornography laws as motivational law on the
assumption that such laws would reduce the motivation for men to violate laws
against the rape and abuse of women.20 However, social scientists draw conflicting
conclusions from the results of existing studies as to whether exposure to
pornography increases aggressive behavior toward women.21
2. Military Disciplinary Rules
Military disciplinary rules are one of the oldest forms of motivational law.
Soldiers of the Roman Legions were forbidden from marrying, in order to “restore

17

Id. at 31.

18

Robert J. Klein, Film Censorship: the American and British Experience, 12 VILL. L.
REV. 419, 424-427 (1967).
19

Id. at 426, quoting Stone, The Legion of Decency: What’s Nude? 5 RAMPARTS 48 (1965).

20

An anti-pornography ordinance written by Dworkin and MacKinnon briefly became law
in Indianapolis. See Cass R. Sunstein, Pornography and the First Amendment, 1986 DUKE
L.J. 589 n.2 (1986). Cf. Paul Chevigny, Pornography and Cognition: a Reply to Cass
Sunstein, 1989 DUKE L.J. 420, 432 (1989); ANDREA DWORKIN, PORNOGRAPHY: MEN
POSSESSING WOMEN (Perigee Books 3rd ed., 1981); Andrea Dworkin, Pornography Happens
to Women (1993), available at http://www.nostatusquo.com/ACLU/dworkin/PornHappens.
html (address given at the University of Chicago Law School); Catherine MacKinnon,
Pornography as Trafficking, 26 MICH. J. INT. L. 993 (2005). Catherine MacKinnon,
Pornography Left and Right, 30 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 143 (1995).
21
“Despite the accumulation of an exceedingly large body of literature on the effects of
exposure to sexually explicit materials [cites omitted] and despite the efforts of no fewer than
five commissions of inquiry on this subject appointed by the US [cites omitted] and Canadian
[cites omitted] governments, conclusions concerning effects of exposure to sexually explicit
materials remain elusive.” Azy Barak & William A. Fisher, Effects of Interactive Computer
Erotica on Men’s Attitudes and Behavior Toward Women: an Experimental Study, 13
COMPUTERS IN HUM. BEHAV. 353, 354 (1997) (finding “use of computer pornography did not
affect . . . attitudes or behavior toward women”); William A. Fisher & Guy Grenier, Violent
Pornography, Anti-Woman Thoughts, and Anti-Woman Acts: In Search of Reliable Effects, 31
J. SEX RES. 23 (1994) (no reliable effects demonstrated). A meta-analysis of several studies in
2000 concluded that pornography may increase aggression toward women among men who
already are aggressive, while having divergent effects on non-aggressive men. Neil M.
Malamuth, Tamara Addison & Mary Koss, Pornography and Sexual Aggression: Are There
Reliable Effects and Can We Understand Them? 11 ANN. REV. SEX RES. 26 (2000).
Malamuth, lead author of the meta-analysis, previously had published his own conclusion that
pornography’s effect on aggression had been reliably demonstrated, and his own work was
included in his meta-analysis.
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old’ discipline.”22 Soldiers are required to salute a superior officer, not to be
insubordinate, to wear a uniform on duty, to make their beds, and to comply with a
host of other disciplinary rules.
By complying with these disciplinary rules before they go into combat, soldiers
are supposed to become motivated to obey the orders given by their commanding
officer and the rules of engagement established when they are in battle, 23 as required
by military law.24 They also are supposed to acquire the motivation to refrain from
acts, such as torture of prisoners and unnecessary violence against non-combatants,
that would violate the law of war,25 and to refrain from acts of disloyalty or fear that
would violate laws against treason,26 desertion,27 and, in the American military,
numerous other provisions of the Uniform Code of Military Justice.28
Events in the Middle East illustrate the importance of law as both a source of
intrinsic control even within a command and control structure, and a source of
instability. At Abu Ghraib, soldiers, indoctrinated to obey their superiors, tortured
prisoners in accordance with what they thought were the rules of engagement: do
anything you have to do to get prisoners to talk.29 Similarly, Khalid Sheikh
Mohammed beheaded Daniel Pearl (or so he claimed), and was proud of it, because a
regimen of indoctrination30 prescribed by the motivational law of the Muslim

22
SARA ELISE PHANG, THE MARRIAGE OF ROMAN SOLDIERS (13 B.C.-A.D. 235): LAW AND
FAMILY IN THE IMPERIAL ARMY 325 (E.J. Brill, 2001).
23

MARK J. OSIEL, OBEYING ORDERS: ATROCITY, MILITARY DISCIPLINE & THE LAW OF WAR
16 (1999). (discussing Aristotle’s view that restraint in combat depends on soldiers’ being of
suitable temperament and disposition, and that “the dedicated exercise of a vocation cultivates
within its conscientious practitioners . . . the virtues peculiar to it,” which the author calls a
process of “habituation”).
24
For relevant offenses under American military law, see Arts. 88-92, Uniform Code of
Military Justice, 10 U.S.C. §§ 888-892 [hereinafter U.C.M.J.].
25

The law of war generally is found in four documents: the Hague Conventions, Feb. 2,
1910, 36 Stat. 2259, 2277, and 2314; the Geneva Conventions, Feb. 2, 1956, 6 U.S.T. 3114,
3217, 3316, and 3516 and their 1977 Protocols, and the Conventional Weapons Treaty of
1980, 1342 U.N.T.S. 137. MICHAEL W. REISMAN & CHRIS T. ANTONIOU, THE LAWS OF WAR:
A COMPREHENSIVE COLLECTION OF PRIMARY DOCUMENTS ON INTERNATIONAL LAWS
GOVERNING ARMED CONFLICT (Vintage Books, 1st ed, 1994) These documents establish four
basic principles: military necessity, distinction, proportionality, and humanity. A. P.V.
ROGERS, LAW ON THE BATTLEFIELD 1-26 (Juris Publishing 2nd ed., 1996). Cf. Manuel E.F.
Supervielle, Islam, the Law of War, and the U.S. Soldier, 21 AM. U. INT’L. L. REV. 191 (2005)
(arguing for mandatory education on the Islamic view of the law of war for U.S. soldiers sent
to Iraq).
26

18 U.S.C. § 2381.

27

Art. 85, U.C.M.J., 10 U.S.C. § 885; United States v. Gonzalez, 42 M.J. 469 (C.A.A.F.
1995).
28

See Arts. 86 through 106a and 133, U.C.M.J., 10 U.S.C. §§ 886-906a and 933.

29

On a different version of the facts, if the soldiers knew or had reason to know that torture
was prohibited by the rules of engagement, one could construe Abu Ghraib as a failure of
motivational law. I do not mean to take sides regarding the specific facts of that incident.
30

On its official website, http://www.ummah.net/ikhwan/ the Muslim Brotherhood states
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Brotherhood, of which he was a member from the time he was 16,31 succeeded in
motivating him to commit atrocities in compliance with that organization’s version
of Islamic law (shari’a) on the conduct of a holy war (jihad).
3. Religious Laws
Motivational law has ancient roots in law-based32 religions such as Islam and
traditional Judaism, in which rules on liturgy and ritual and rules mandating religious
dress, diet and holiday observance—rules with a motivational purpose33—not only
have kept religious communities intact, but have endowed their religious legal
systems with great longevity and effectiveness. An Orthodox Jewish man’s wearing
ritual fringes on his clothing may be a cultural norm, but it is a norm with a
motivational purpose34 thrust upon Orthodox Jews by a 3,400-year-old Biblical
injunction they regard as law.35 Islam, too, is full of rules that mandate motivational
practices to ward off the ever-present temptation to violate religious law.36

that its members are indoctrinated to become “organized and self-struggling” through a
regimen of “Islamic education (tarbieh),” which includes “Halaqa (a weekly unit study and
practice meeting)”; “Katibah (a monthly several-units-meeting)”; a “trip”; “camp”; “course”;
“workshop”; and “conference.” (last visited Nov. 15, 2007).
31
See Christina Lamb, Focus: The Confessions of Khalid Sheikh Mohammed, SUNDAY
TIMES, Nov 15, 2007, at 15, available at http://www.timesonline.co.uk/tol/news/world/article
10526 62.ece?token=null&offset=0.
32
Law-based religions identify the objective of one’s life with compliance with a code of
rules, established under divine authority. Traditional Judaism and Islam both have codes of
law, even covering tort and contract law. In contrast, in faith- or mind-state-based religions,
the objective of one’s life is to gain immortality by achieving a certain state of consciousness.
In the Protestant denominations of Christianity the state of consciousness is complete faith in
Jesus as the savior from sin, and in Buddhism it is satori leading to nirvana. See infra notes
37-38.
33

Regarding the motivational purpose of Jewish liturgy, see ARNOLD S. ROSENBERG,
JEWISH LITURGY AS A SPIRITUAL SYSTEM 4 (1997).
34

Numbers 15:38-39 (Schocken):
Speak to the Children of Israel and say to them that they are to make themselves
tassels on the corners of their garments…that you may look at it and keep-in-mind all
the commandments of YHWH and observe them, that you not go scouting-around
after your heart, after your eyes which you go whoring after . . . .
Biblical translations in this article are from The Schocken Bible: Volume I: The Five Books of
Moses (Everett Fox trans., 1995).
35
Historically, the practice of wearing knotted ritual fringes may have been derived from
ancient Persian religion. Some Zoroastrians today continue to wear knotted cords, called
kusti, as a reminder of their religious obligations. MARY BOYCE, ZOROASTRIANS: THEIR
RELIGIOUS BELIEFS AND PRACTICES 31 (1979).
36
For instance, some ascribe to the requirement of salat, the five-times-daily prayer
mandated by Islamic law, a rationale that resembles that of the knotted ritual fringes in
Judaism and Zoroastrianism:
The constant guarding against disobedience [of Islamic law] and sins wakes you up for
the morning prayer. Salat is not just what you say with your mouth and do with your
limbs. It is a state of your heart. So when you do things in a day for God and avoid
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Christianity is predominantly, though not exclusively, a faith-based religion.
Roman Catholicism considers Old Testament motivational laws on religious dress
and ritual to be non-binding,37 and the Protestant denominations since Martin Luther
have considered that one can be saved through faith in Jesus alone rather than
through good works, though faith motivates people to perform good works.38
other things because of Him, it means you’re thinking about Him, and therefore it
becomes easy for you to strive for Him against yourself and your desires.
Saba Mahmood, Rehearsed Spontaneity and the Conventionality of Ritual: Disciplines of
Salat, 28 AM. ETHNOLOGIST 827, 831 (2001), quoting “Mona,” a member of the Women’s
Mosque movement in Cairo.
37

The Catholic Church follows Thomas Aquinas, who classified the Old Testament laws
on religious dress and ritual purity as “ceremonial” and therefore not binding, having been
superseded by the new covenant (“New Law”) of Jesus. See THOMAS AQUINAS, SUMMA
THEOLOGICA (PRIMA SECUNDAE PARTIS) Question 101 (2d ed. 1920) (online ed., Kevin Knight
trans., 2006), available at http://www.newadvent. org/summa/2101.htm:
[T]he ceremonial precepts are those which refer to the worship of God. Now the
Divine worship is twofold: internal, and external. For since man is composed of soul
and body, each of these should be applied to the worship of God; the soul by an
interior worship; the body by an outward worship: hence it is written (Psalms 83:3):
“My heart and my flesh have rejoiced in the living God.” And as the body is ordained
to God through the soul, so the outward worship is ordained to the internal worship.
Now interior worship consists in the soul being united to God by the intellect and
affections. Wherefore according to the various ways in which the intellect and
affections of the man who worships God are rightly united to God, his external
actions are applied in various ways to the Divine worship. For in the state of future
bliss, the human intellect will gaze on the Divine Truth in Itself. Wherefore the
external worship will not consist in anything figurative, but solely in the praise of
God, proceeding from the inward knowledge and affection, according to Is. 51:3:
“Joy and gladness shall be found therein, thanksgiving and the voice of praise.” But in
the present state of life, we are unable to gaze on the Divine Truth in Itself, and we
need the ray of Divine light to shine upon us under the form of certain sensible figures,
as Dionysius states (Coel. Hier. i); in various ways, however, according to the
various states of human knowledge. For under the Old Law, neither was the Divine
Truth manifest in Itself, nor was the way leading to that manifestation as yet opened
out, as the Apostle declares (Hebrews 9:8). Hence the external worship of the Old
Law needed to be figurative not only of the future truth to be manifested in our
heavenly country, but also of Christ, Who is the way leading to that heavenly
manifestation.
But under the New Law this way is already revealed: and therefore it needs no longer
to be foreshadowed as something future, but to be brought to our minds as something
past or present: and the truth of the glory to come, which is not yet revealed, alone
needs to be foreshadowed. This is what the Apostle says (Hebrews 11:1): “The
Law has [Vulg.: 'having'] a shadow of the good things to come, not the very image of
the things”: for a shadow is less than an image; so that the image belongs to the New
Law, but the shadow to the Old.
38

Martin Luther wrote:
Faith is a living, bold trust in God's grace, so certain of God's favor that it would risk
death a thousand times trusting in it. Such confidence and knowledge of God's grace
makes you happy, joyful and bold in your relationship to God and all creatures. The
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Islamic societies in which motivational law is deeply ingrained clash with
predominantly Christian democracies that do not use it as much and understand it
even less.
Ancient religious rulemakers assumed that mandating rituals, liturgy or religious
dress would increase compliance with other religious laws and bind the religious
community together.39 The Bush Administration’s policy of funding “faith-based”
social service organizations is rooted in a similar assumption, fed by studies funded
and conducted by Christian conservative organizations,40 that increased religious
faith could increase compliance with law. However, the objective of law-based
religions such as Judaism and Islam is not that the adherent should have faith or be
saved through faith but that the adherent should comply with regulatory religious
laws that govern his or her conduct vis-à-vis other people, nature and the divine.
Holy Spirit makes this happen through faith. Because of it, you freely, willingly and
joyfully do good to everyone, serve everyone, suffer all kinds of things, love and
praise the God who has shown you such grace. Thus, it is just as impossible to
separate faith and works as it is to separate heat and light from fire!
63 DR. MARTIN LUTHER’S VERMISCHTE DEUTSCHE SCHRIFTEN 124-125 (Johann K. Irmischer
ed., Robert E. Smith trans., 1854), available at http://www.iclnet.org/pub/resources/text/
wittenberg/luther/luther-faith.txt.
39

For example, following the destruction of the Second Temple, Rabban Gamaliel II
standardized the format of the Amidah (“Standing Prayer”) as a substitute for Temple
sacrifice, in order to make it more likely that the community would survive to restore
compliance with divine commandments concerning sacrificial worship that required the return
of the exiled Jews and rebuilding of the Temple. THE BABYLONIAN TALMUD, Berakhot 26b;
ROSENBERG, supra note 33, at 75-76; ISMAR ELBOGEN, JEWISH LITURGY: A COMPREHENSIVE
HISTORY 31-32, 201-02 (Raymond Scheindlin trans., 1993). See also Ezra Fleischer, On the
Beginnings of Obligatory Jewish Prayer, 59 TARBIZ 397 (1990) (Hebrew); The Shemone Esre:
Its Character, Internal Order, Content and Goals, 62 TARBIZ 179 (1992) (Hebrew); Reuven
Kimelman, The Daily Amidah and the Rhetoric of Redemption, 79 JEWISH. Q. REV. 165
(1989); Leon J. Liebreich, The Intermediate Benedictions of the Amidah, 42 JEWISH. Q. REV.
423 (1952).
40
For example, So Help Me God: Substance Abuse, Religion and Spirituality was a 2001
study largely funded by the John Templeton Foundation and conducted by the National Center
on Addition and Substance Abuse, an organization, chaired by Joseph Califano, with a board
of directors that included Columba Bush (wife of Gov. Jeb Bush), Kenneth Chenault, a
prominent donor to conservative causes, and Nancy Reagan. The title of an article about
Califano made the point: Thou Shalt Not: Once a Presidential Adviser and Legal
Heavyweight, Joe Califano Now is Thundering Against Drugs. And Woe Be to Those Who
Doubt His Data or Get in His Way. WASHINGTONIAN MAG. Oct., 1998, at 71. Another
example is Byron R. Johnson, OBJECTIVE HOPE: ASSESSING THE EFFECTIVENESS OF FAITHBASED ORGANIZATIONS: A REVIEW OF THE LITERATURE (2002), http://www.manhattaninstitute.org/html/crrucs-obj_hope.htm, which was dedicated “to the memory of Dr. David B.
Larson, the pioneering leader of faith factor research.” When doing “faith factor research,” it
is not likely that one will find “faith” not to be a factor. Dr. Johnson was “deluged with
requests for…research to support . . . assertions by President Bush and other politicians that
religious programs can transform . . . lives . . . , and that it can do so for less money than
government programs.” Laurie Goodstein, Church-Based Projects Lack Data on Results N.
Y. TIMES, Apr. 24, 2001, at A12. Johnson was quoted as saying that “there is little reliable
research proving the effectiveness of religious programs,” a point that one has to glean from
reading his cautiously-worded conclusions very carefully. Both studies were published
independently rather than in peer-reviewed journals.
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4. Censorship Laws
Authoritarian regimes use censorship laws to motivate citizens to comply with
their commands. Most laws requiring censorship of the news have a motivational
purpose in this sense.41 The statute of Nazi Germany requiring all healthy “Aryan”
children over the age of nine to join the Hitler Youth42 served the motivational
purpose of ensuring their indoctrination and obedience, as well as expanding the
force of free child labor to support the German military and propaganda machines.
The Ministry of Information of the People’s Republic of China currently censors
Internet news services according to 2005 regulations, which give the purpose of
censorship as to ensure news reports are “serving socialism,” “upholding the
interests of the state,” and “correctly guiding public opinion.”43
5. Credit Counseling Requirement for Consumer Bankruptcy
The Bankruptcy Abuse Prevention and Consumer Protection Act of 2005
(“BAPCPA”) imposed new eligibility requirements for consumers who file Chapter
7 bankruptcy petitions.44 The principal new requirement is the means test contained
in Bankruptcy Code §707(b), but BAPCPA also requires that the debtor undergo
credit counseling, both before and after the petition is filed.45
41

Of course, not all censorship of news is motivational. Military press censorship has the
non-motivational function of withholding strategic information from the enemy. Cf. Jack A.
Gottschalk, Consistent with Security: a History of American Military Press Censorship, 5
COMM. & L. 35 (1983). The several exceptions in the Freedom of Information Act (“FOIA”),
5 U.S.C. § 552(b) (2000), exist for non-motivational purposes, rather than because release of
the excepted information would endanger the legitimacy of the government.
[FOIA's] basic policy of “ ‘full agency disclosure unless information is exempted
under clearly delineated statutory language,’ ” indeed focuses on the citizens' right to
be informed about “what their government is up to.” Official information that sheds
light on an agency's performance of its statutory duties falls squarely within that
statutory purpose.
U.S. Dept. of Justice v. Reporters Comm. For Freedom of Press, 489 U.S. 749, 773 (1989)
(citations omitted).
42
Reich Youth Service Law, December 1939. See ALFONS HECK, A CHILD
GERMANY IN THE DAYS WHEN GOD WORE A SWASTIKA 7 (1985).

OF

HITLER:

43

People’s Republic of China Ministry of Information and State Council, Rules on the
Administration of Internet News Services (September 25, 2005). See Kristen Farrell, Big
Mamas are Watching: China’s Censorship of the Internet and the Strain on Freedom of
Expression, 15 MICH. ST. J. INT’L. L. 577, 589 (2007).
44

Pub. L. 109-8, 119 Stat. 23 (2005).

45

With few exceptions, the debtor must have undergone a “briefing” by an approved
budget and credit counseling agency within 180 days before filing the petition that covered the
types of credit counseling programs available, and assisted the debtor in preparing a “related
budget analysis”. 11 U.S.C. § 109(h) (2000). Approved pre-petition briefings must take at
least 90 minutes. BAPCPA §104, codified at 11 U.S.C. § 342(b) (2000), also requires the
clerk of the Bankruptcy Court to give notice to debtors of the “alternative” of credit
counseling. After filing the petition, the debtor must complete “an instructional course
concerning personal financial management” as a condition for discharge. 11 U.S.C. §
727(a)(11) (2000). See Karen Gross and Susan Block-Lieb, Empty Mandate or Opportunity
for Innovation? Pre-Petition Credit Counseling and Post-Petition Financial Management
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These eligibility requirements generally were intended to motivate consumer
debtors to comply with their obligations under contract law to the extent possible
rather than discharge them in bankruptcy:
[B]ankruptcy should not merely be a means of violating promises willynilly. A promise to repay money is an important legal and moral
obligation, neither lightly to be undertaken nor lightly cast away. Filing
bankruptcy represents a decision to repudiate promises made in exchange
for goods, services, and other promises. Of such promises and reciprocity
is the fabric of civil society woven.46
Chapter 7 debtors with incomes above the state median now risk dismissal of
their petitions for “abuse” under §707(b) unless they show their disposable income,
calculated according to a formula based on living expense standards developed for
tax collection purposes, would be insufficient to pay at least $100 per month on their
general unsecured debts, or if able to pay between $100 and $166, that over five
years they still could not pay at least 25% of those debts. Debtors who flunk the
means test must spend five years paying all of their disposable income to creditors
under Chapter 13, or forego bankruptcy altogether.
The same motivational concept underlies credit counseling. The pre-bankruptcy
“briefing” requirement can make bankruptcy impracticable where time is of the
essence.47 Post-bankruptcy financial management counseling is supposed to
motivate the debtor to manage her finances so as to avoid future breaches of
contract.48
6. Prohibition of Abortion Counseling
The Missouri statute upheld by the United States Supreme Court in Webster v.
Reproductive Health Services,49 prohibiting abortion counseling for pregnant
women, was intended to prevent the encouragement of abortion. Proponents of the
legislation believed that women have a legal obligation to protect their unborn
children which would be violated by an abortion, and that counseling by abortion
advocates would motivate them to violate that obligation. Put another way, the
purpose of the Missouri statute was to prevent interference with motivation on the
part of pregnant women to comply with a perceived obligation to protect the fetus.

Education, 13 AM. BANKR. INST. L. REV. 549 (2005).
46
Edith H. Jones and Todd J. Zywicki, It’s Time for Means-Testing, 1999 BYU L. REV.
177, 181 (1999).
47

See, e.g., In re Gee, 332 B.R. 602 (Bankr. W.D. Mo. 2005) (dismissing petition where
debtor failed to satisfy the pre-bankruptcy “briefing” requirement of § 109(h), though a
foreclosure sale of her home was scheduled for the same day that she filed her petition).
48
Gross and Block-Lieb, supra note 45, at 549 (stating that the purpose of credit
counseling requirement in BAPCPA was to give debtors “the financial knowledge or insights
to make better choices in the consumer financial markets after their cases were closed”).
49

Webster v. Reprod. Health Servs., 492 U.S. 490 (1989).
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7. Rehabilitation in the Criminal Justice System
Laws aimed at rehabilitating offenders have an obvious motivational function.
Rehabilitation recently has seen a resurgence as an objective in criminal justice,
particularly in the juvenile justice system,50 with the establishment of specialized
courts that have a rehabilitative focus, attempting to motivate juveniles with drug
problems, for example, to refrain from further violations of anti-drug laws and laws
prohibiting crimes they committed, such as robbery and burglary, to feed their drug
habit.51 Some states have gone so far as to enact statutes establishing what they call
“motivational boot camps” for offenders.52
Motivational law also has crept into sentencing in recent years as trial judges
have devised creative approaches that incorporate motivational techniques in order to
prevent recidivism. One such technique is formal shaming, by such measures as
requiring defendants convicted of drunk driving to place signs on their cars
identifying them as convicted drunk drivers.53 Where formal shaming is imposed
with the intent to change the mind of the defendant and instill motivation to comply
with the law, it is a form of motivational law. For instance, convicted felons may be
forced to have ongoing interaction with their victims or others harmed by their
conduct in the hope that they will be sensitized to the consequences of their crimes
and avoid them in the future. Such sentencing practices may be justified as
rehabilitative,54 but whether formal shaming works will depend largely on whether
the individual is a member of a group whose opinion of his behavior matters to him,
whether that group’s conduct toward the individual is altered by knowledge of his
crime, and whether the individual has a means of redeeming himself in the eyes of
the group through compliance with the law.55
8. Motivational Rules in the Common Law
As discussed above, the requirement of consideration to form a contract
possesses a motivational function.56 It is not alone; other common law rules also
serve motivational purposes. For example, the rule of evidence law making evidence
of subsequent remedial measures inadmissible in tort cases to prove negligence or
culpability originated in the English chancery courts to avoid “hold[ing] out an
inducement for continued negligence,”57 i.e., to avoid motivating past tortfeasors to
50

Daniel M. Filler & Austin E. Smith, The New Rehabilitation, 91 IOWA L. REV. 951
(2006).
51

Id. at 954.

52

See, e.g., 61 PA. STAT. ANN. § 1121 (Supp. 1998); Pa. Dep’t of Corrs. v. Yeskey, 524
U.S. 206 (1998).
53

Toni M. Massaro, Shame, Culture and American Criminal Law, 89 MICH. L. REV. 1880
(1990).
54

Id. at 1894-1895.

55

Id. at 1888.

56

See supra note 9, at 1.

57

Columbia & P.S.R. R.R. Co. v. Hawthorne, 144 U.S. 202 (1892) (citing Hart v. Ry.
Co.,16 N.W. 358, 359 (1883)); 2 JOHN HENRY WIGMORE, EVIDENCE IN TRIALS AT COMMON
LAW §283, 175 (James H. Chadbourn ed., 1979). See also FED. R. EVID. 407.
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breach their duty to exercise due care in the future. Like consideration, livery of
seisin in property law, the required formalities to make a will, and the use of a seal as
a substitute for consideration all performed motivational functions in addition to their
evidentiary functions, attempting to drive home to the parties the seriousness of what
they were doing in order to ensure they were motivated to comply with the legal
duties they were undertaking, or in the case of a will, to encourage them to ensure
that their named executor and beneficiaries were motivated to comply with the duties
they were imposing and to accept the allocation of rights among them under the will.
9. Monarchical Privileges
Absolute monarchies have relied on motivational law since antiquity. In ancient
Persia, the visitor had to prostrate himself for, kneel in front of, bow for or blow a
kiss to the king. The Greeks originally observed such rules only for gods, but
beginning in the 4th century B.C. various Greek rulers, including the rulers of
Syracuse, then the largest and most powerful of the city-states, and later Alexander
the Great himself, declared themselves gods and imposed similar requirements to
motivate their subjects to obey the laws they dictated.58
Laws regarding the privileges and pomp of modern constitutional monarchies are
a vestige of these ancient practices intended to motivate compliance with the ruler’s
commands. The institution of royalty in a constitutional or parliamentary
monarchical system today performs primarily a motivational function.59 Laws that
command public respect for the position of the Queen of England are supposed to
fortify the inclination of her subjects to comply with the laws enacted by her
government.60
10. Procedural Due Process
In a broad sense, the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment of the United
States Constitution is an example of motivational law. Authorities generally are
regarded as having the right to dictate behavior if their claim of this right derives
from a process regarded as fair, and if their past efforts at dictating behavior had
outcomes regarded as fair. For example, citizens more willingly accept the outcomes
58
See Jona Lendering, Alexander the God, http://www.livius.org/aj-al/alexander/
alexander_z3.html (last visited Oct. 24, 2007). See also Praise Poem of Shulgi, http://earthhistory.com/Sumer/sumer-poem-shulgi.htm (last visited Oct. 24, 2007) (ancient Sumer, over
4,500 years ago).
59

One commentator on a BBC News program regarding whether to abolish the monarchy
made the following connection between motivation and the institution of the monarchy:
Republics are very sterile, where you don't look to the head of state with any kind of
affection. If you saw the candidates at the last Irish presidential election you would
understand, there was no passion and even a little apathy about the choice. The
monarchy is instantly recognisable across the world and a great reflection of historical
stability.
Talking Point: What’s the Enduring Appeal of the Royal Family? (BBC Television Broadcast
Aug. 9, 2000) available at http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/talking_point/843408.stm.
60

For example, new citizens in the U.K. must take an oath of allegiance to the Queen.
Nationality, Immigration & Asylum Act, 2002, c. 41, § 3, sched. 1 (Eng.). Practicing any
harm to, or slandering, the King, Queen or heirs apparent is considered high treason and is
punishable by life imprisonment. Crime & Disorder Act, 1998, c. 37, § 36 (Eng.).
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of litigation and comply with court orders if the court that issues those orders has a
track record of issuing orders regarded as just and follows procedures generally
regarded as consistent with norms of fairness.61 The same rules of procedure that
make the judicial system fair, or at least give it the appearance of fairness, also
motivate citizens to comply with the orders and judgments that are the system’s
output.
C. Motivational Law in Legal Theory
H.L.A. Hart famously distinguished between primary “duty-imposing” rules and
secondary “power-conferring” rules, and located the “central elements” of law in the
interplay between these two kinds of rules.62 Hart’s theory of law performs poorly,
however, in identifying the central elements of motivational law.
Many motivational laws are primary rules by Hart’s definition because they
require human beings “to do or abstain from certain actions, whether they wish to or
not,”63 yet compelling the actions they enjoin people to do or abstain from doing is
secondary to their overall purpose. Wearing tzitzit, ritual fringes, for example, is a
primary rule in Jewish law; a Jewish man is obligated to wear them whether he
wishes to or not. Yet, the principal objective of the rule on wearing tzitzit is to
motivate people to perform divine commandments, or mitzvot. A Jewish man who
wears tzitzit but performs no other commandments has fulfilled the letter of the
primary rule but frustrated its purpose.
Moreover, many of the 613 divine commandments in the Torah (Five Books of
Moses) would be neither primary nor secondary rules according to Hart, since they
neither impose a duty nor give powers to people.64 Rather, they are mere
exhortations to do things that one is, in Hart’s terminology, “obliged” rather than
“obligated” to perform. For example, Deuteronomy provides that if one goes to war,
one should not fear his enemies,65 and it commands people to “love God”66 and
imitate God’s good and upright ways.67 Fear is natural in war, the commandment is
just an exhortation to try to overcome it, and one can never say she has loved God or
imitated God’s ways sufficiently to have satisfied the commandment to do so. Under
Hart’s analysis these “commandments” are not even rules, yet the commandment to
wear tzitzit to remind oneself to perform those non-rules is a primary rule.
Other motivational laws would be secondary rules in Hart’s analysis. The
common law does not compel a party to enter into a contract, it just empowers it to
do so by, inter alia, complying with the formality of consideration. But the purpose
of the formality, apart from its evidentiary and channeling functions, is to motivate
contracting parties to be serious about promises, and by virtue of that seriousness, to
61

TYLER, supra note 3.

62

H.L.A. HART, THE CONCEPT OF LAW 81, 240 (1997).

63

Id. at 81.

64

HART, supra note 62, at 81. For a complete list of the 613 commandments organized by
subject-matter, see http://www.jewfaq.org/613.htm.
65

Deuteronomy 3:22, 7:21, 20:3, 20:4 (Schocken).

66

Deuteronomy 6:5 (Schocken).

67

Deuteronomy 28:9 (Schocken).
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comply with the obligations they assume under contract law. Secondary rules can
perform a motivational function just as primary rules can, but this identity of
function is lost in Hart’s dichotomy of laws.
According to Lon Fuller’s functionalist conception of law68 and the more recent
legal pluralist theories, motivational laws would qualify as laws. In Fuller’s theory,
laws must satisfy seven conditions: they must be expressed in general yet
understandable terms; publicly promulgated; prospective in effect; consistent with
one another; not require conduct beyond the powers of the affected parties; not be
changed so frequently that the subject cannot rely on them; and administered
consistently with their wording.69 Motivational laws are generally capable of
satisfying these conditions but are no different from regulatory laws in these
respects. As in Hart’s case, the lack of a distinction in Fuller’s theory obscures the
distinction between motivational law and regulatory law in practice.
Motivational laws are particularly common among religions and in industry selfregulation.
Lacking coercive power, most religious institutions and trade
organizations must find alternative sources of motivation to achieve compliance with
their rules. Are religious laws, industry codes, and other non-governmental rules that
perform a motivational function “laws” even though they are not enacted by the
sovereign authority? Hart would deny that a rule can be “law” when it is not
promulgated by a sovereign whose orders are habitually obeyed.70 Weber and
Durkheim would characterize them as norms. Yet, functionally they may be any of
the above, or all of them.
Non-governmental rules such as industry codes and religious laws easily qualify
as “law” in legal pluralist theory, in which the quest for “law” is a largely semantic
endeavor.
An “extended” view of legal pluralism points out that . . . in contemporary
societies there are a range . . . rule systems, normative orderings and
symbolic meaning systems that should, or could, also be described as
“law”. Families, corporations, ethnic and religious groups, friendship
groups and many other ‘semi-autonomous social fields’ can all ‘generate
rules and customs and symbols internally’ that influence people’s
behaviour and consciousness as much, or more, than does the official
law.71
In the view of legal positivists, motivation for compliance makes no difference in
determining whether a rule or principle is “law”. Consider hijab, Islamic law
requiring modesty in dress. Hijab is normative in many parts of the Islamic world,
but it also is a set of rules based on interpretations of passages of the Qu’ran72 and

68

See LON L. FULLER, THE MORALITY OF LAW 46-91 (2d ed. 1969).

69

Id. at 46-91.

70
HART, supra note 62, at 44-49; id. at 50 (devoting considerable attention to what is
meant by “habit” and “obedience”).
71

Parker, supra note 13, at 3-4 (citing D.J. GALLIGAN, LAW IN MODERN SOCIETY 173-192
(Clarendon Law Series, 2007)); See also Tamanaha, supra note 13, at 298; Black, supra note
13, at 134-35; Merry, supra note 13, at 886-88.
72

Qu’ran 33:59 (“believing women” told to “cast their outer garments over their persons . .
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the Hadith,73 backed by a threat of divine punishment for non-compliance. By
Austin’s classic definition of “law” as a command backed by a threat of a sanction,74
Islamic rules regarding hijab are law, whether or not the woman to whom the
command is directed believes in the divine sanctions that are the only possible
formal punishment. Legal pluralism, too, renders motivation irrelevant; just about
any rule, principle, norm or custom is “law.”
D. Motivational Law’s Boundaries
A command coupled with a threat of sanctions is motivational in that the purpose
of the threat is to instill motivation to comply. However, by my definition,75 “murder
is a felony punishable by life in prison” is a regulatory rather than motivational law
because its purpose or function is to regulate human behavior by making murder
illegal, not to motivate compliance with another law.
Psychologists disagree on how to define “motivation.”76 One concise and
comprehensible definition is the “drives, urges, wishes, or desires which initiate . . .
. that they should be known (as such) and not molested”); Qu’ran 33:32 (wives of the Prophet
told “if you fear God, do not be too complacent in your speech, lest the lecherous-hearted
should lust after you. Talk with such people in plain and simple words. Abide still in your
homes and do not display your finery as women used to do in the days of ignorance. Attend to
your prayers, give alms and obey God and His Messenger. O woman of this house, the
Almighty wants to cleanse you from the filth [these hypocrites want to besmear you with] and
to fully purify you”); Surah an-Nurayah 31 (enjoining women to dress modestly except in the
presence of close relatives, small children “to whom the nakedness of women is not apparent,”
and “followers from the men who do not feel sexual desire”)
73

The authoritative Hadith of Sahih Bukhari provides the most widely accepted source for
hijab. It says, “My Lord agreed with me ('Umar) in three things . . . (2) And as regards the
veiling of women, I said 'O Allah's Apostle! I wish you ordered your wives to cover
themselves from the men because good and bad ones talk to them.' So the verse of the veiling
of the women was revealed.” BUKHARI, Vol. 1, Book 8, Sunnah 395. SUNAN ABU DAWUD,
Vol. 3, Book XXVII, Ch. 1535, Hadith No. 4092 is also cited: “A’isha said: Asma’, daughter
of Abu Bakr, entered upon the Apostle of Allah (May peace be upon him) wearing thin
clothes. The Apostle of Allah (peace be upon him) turned his attention from her. He said: O
Asma’, when a woman reaches the age of menstruation, it does not suit her that she displays
her parts of body except this and this, and he pointed to her face and hands.”
74
JOHN AUSTIN, THE PROVINCE OF JURISPRUDENCE DETERMINED 14-15 (David Campbell &
Philip Thomas eds., 1998). Austin, writing in the early 1830s, and following Bentham, was
attempting to give a definition of law that was not loaded with moral judgments, law as it is
rather than law as it should be. A law, which actually exists, is a law, though we happen to
dislike it. Id. at 184-85. Natural law philosophers, in contrast, postulated the existence of a
divine law, sometimes consistent with earthly legislation and sometimes not. In this context,
Austin’s definition actually broadened the notion of law from those earthly enactments that
were consistent with divine law or morals, to include those that were not. He was careful to
add that the promise of a reward is not a “sanction,” therefore legislation that promised a
reward for obeying a command, but lacked a threat of punishment for violating it, was not a
“law.” Id.
75

See Part II.A of the text.

76

A 1981 study catalogued a total of 102 different definitions of “motivation” used in
psychology. Paul R. Kleinginna & Anne M. Kleinginna, A Categorized List of Motivation
Definitions, With a Suggestion for a Consensual Definition, 5 MOTIVATION & EMOTION 263,
273-87 (1981). See also Richard A. Littman, Motives, History and Causes, in NEBRASKA
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“behavior”.”77 Laws can instill the drive, urge, wish and desire to comply with other
laws in three ways other than deterrence: by creating incentives or the perception of
incentives for compliance with other laws, making it easier or more feasible for
people to comply with other laws, or mandating or inducing people to act in ways
that make them more likely to comply with other laws.
Incentives need not be tangible; they can be religious rewards.78 Another
instrumental form of motivational law is laws that place in people’s hands the means
to comply with other laws, such as laws mandating publicity and educational
campaigns to promote compliance with new statutes or administrative regulations
and laws appropriating funds to facilitate compliance with previously unfunded legal
mandates. Congress takes motivation into account continually when it appropriates
funds for public education and advertising campaigns to promote compliance with
statutory obligations.79 The federal government spends over $1 billion annually for
advertising.80
Motivational laws may mandate or facilitate actions to heighten the perception of
legitimacy, or mandate or facilitate actions that heighten the normative influence of a
reference group or community to comply with laws or rules consistent with, or
expressive of, the norms of the group or community.81 Motivational laws also can
SYMPOSIUM ON MOTIVATION: 1958 114, 136-37,(Marshall R. Jones ed., 6th vol. 1970) (1958).
A Google search for a definition of “motivation,” http://www.google.com/search?hl=en&defl=
en&q=define:MOTIVATION&sa=X&oi=glossary_definition&ct=title, conducted on April
15, 2007, yielded 30 definitions. Among the best and simplest: “desire to accomplish a goal or
participate in an endeavor;” “feelings that drive someone toward a particular objective;” and
“the need or desire that determines an individual’s effort, behaviors and actions.”
77

James A. Bayton, Motivation, Cognition, Learning: Basic Factors in Human Behavior,
22 J. MKTG. 282, 282 (1958).
78
The Bible says God rewards goodness—performing God’s commandments - “unto the
thousandth generation.” Exodus 20:6 (Schocken). And the Qu’ran says “martyrs” (shahadeh)
“will be with . . . goodly” women who have “obey[ed] Allah and the Apostle.” Qu’ran 4:69.
Of course, what constitutes “martyrdom” is hotly contested within Islam and is beyond the
scope of this paper.
79

Typical examples abound. See, e.g., S. 1139, 108th Cong. §2(b) (2003) (mandating a
compliance campaign focused on reducing alcohol-impaired driving and increasing seat belt
use); H.R. 4747, 108th Cong. §6 (2004) (proposing ten million dollars for education regarding
the Dietary Supplement Health and Education Act of 1994 through “public education forums,
advertising, and the Internet”).
80

KEVIN R. KOSAR, CONGRESSIONAL RESEARCH SERVICE REPORT FOR CONGRESS, PUBLIC
RELATIONS & PROPAGANDA: RESTRICTIONS ON EXECUTIVE AGENCY ACTIVITIES at n.29 (2005),
available at http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/RL32750.pdf (citing KEVIN R. KOSAR,
CONGRESSIONAL RESEARCH SERVICE REPORT FOR CONGRESS, GOVERNMENT ADVERTISING
EXPENDITURES: AN OVERVIEW (2004)). In addition, federal agencies contracted out $88 million
for public relations services. Id. at 8. Federal funding for publicity is normally supposed to
promote compliance with law; appropriations laws for roughly the past fifty years have
included a provision that prohibits expenditure of funds “for propaganda and publicity
purposes not authorized by Congress.” Id. at 5.
81

See David Engel, Globalization and the Decline of Legal Consciousness: Torts, Ghosts
and Karma in Thailand, 30 LAW & SOC. INQUIRY 469 (2005) (showing a decline in legal
consciousness corresponding to a sense of powerlessness due, inter alia, to the perception of
increased corruption in the Thai judicial system).

https://engagedscholarship.csuohio.edu/clevstlrev/vol56/iss1/6

18

2008]

MOTIVATIONAL LAW

129

function through legal consciousness, by raising awareness of legal rights and
obligations.82 While motivational laws promote a consciousness of duties under
religious law, they do not necessarily lead to increased consciousness of legal rights
under secular law. In fact, religious forms of discourse and religious grounds are
sometimes used by religious adherents to rationalize the conscious decision to refrain
from exercising legal rights they possess under secular law.83
Laws that mandate or facilitate acts that heighten the normative influence of a
reference group or community to comply with laws or rules consistent with, or
expressive of, the norms of the group or community include laws that promote group
cohesion and allegiance to the group. Religious laws promoting a sense of spiritual
community or religious identity in turn motivate individual members of the group to
do what they perceive will enhance their reputation within the group.84 Laws on
national independence celebrations or recital of a national anthem have the purpose
of heightening the influence of the community on individuals to promote compliance
with other laws that require citizens to perform civic duties such as military service,

82
The term “legal consciousness” is used loosely in scholarship. Some use the phrase to
refer to attitudes about law. See, e.g., Loretta J. Stalans & Karyl A. Kinsey, Self-presentation
and Legal Socialization in Society: Available Messages About Personal Tax Audits, 28 LAW &
SOC’Y REV. 859 (1994) (discussing legal consciousness as the degree to which the rule of law
is part of the socialization and habits of the population, in the sense that law is injected into
daily routine and thereby structures social interaction). Others discuss legal consciousness as
a normative consensus about law and fairness. See TYLER, supra note 3; CAROL J.
GREENHOUSE, PRAYING FOR JUSTICE: FAITH, ORDER, & COMMUNITY IN AN AMERICAN TOWN
(Roger Sanjek ed., 1986); JOHN THIBAULT & LAURENS WALKER, PROCEDURAL JUSTICE: A
PSYCHOLOGICAL ANALYSIS (1975). Still others use “legal consciousness” to refer to the ways
in which people discuss or experience law. See, e.g., PATRICIA EWICK & SUSAN SILBEY, THE
COMMON PLACE OF LAW: STORIES FROM EVERYDAY LIFE (William O’Barr & John M. Conley
eds., 1998); JOHN M. CONLEY & WILLIAM M. O’BARR, RULES VERSUS RELATIONSHIPS: THE
ETHNOGRAPHY OF LEGAL DISCOURSE (William O’Barr & John M. Conley eds., 1990). I use the
term as Stalans & Kinsey define it.
83
To illustrate this point, consider what David Engel characterized as a decline of legal
consciousness in northern Thailand. Engel, supra note 81, at 469. During the period between
1975, when he conducted initial field research, and 1998 through 2004 when he conducted a
second study, he found tort victims in Chiangmai had become less inclined to pursue judicial
remedies and tended to rationalize their decisions through Buddhist teachings. Id. at 469- 472.
He attributed this disinclination to globalization. Id. Engel’s data, however, reflect not that his
subjects had become less conscious of their legal rights, but less motivated to pursue legal
remedies. They used religious language and precepts to rationalize what were pragmatic
decisions in light of the cost and corruption of the local judicial system. Engel’s results also
may have been influenced by the religion he chose to study, because Buddhism, above most
other religions, stresses mind-state rather than compliance with laws that govern worldly
conduct.
84

An example is the requirement in Judaism of a minyan, a group of ten adults that is a
requisite for formal prayer. Mourners cannot perform their obligation under religious law to
recite the mourner’s prayer (Kaddish Yatom) without a minyan. See ABRAHAM MILLGRAM,
JEWISH WORSHIP 155 (1971); ROSENBERG, supra note 33, at 50. The minyan requirement both
reinforces the community and satisfies the need of mourners to be assuaged. Id. Analogous
laws in other religions require individuals to have a spiritual advisor or mentor or to
participate in group missionary work.
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jury duty, or voting in elections, and to comply with laws prohibiting acts against the
national security.
Where rules coincide with social norms, motivation comes from the same sources
as the norms: education, family life, peer group influence. Norms function through
inculcated self-regulatory mechanisms,85 such as internalized moral principles.86
Because norms are held by a peer or reference group, compliance with norms also
may be driven by fear that one will be punished, shamed or shunned by that group if
she fails to comply with its norms; though norms usually act to increase motivation,
they may be enforced through extrinsic control where motivation is lacking.87
However, norms are an imperfect source of motivation for intrinsic control.
They are not universally and thoroughly inculcated in people, that is why society has
its rebels, misfits, and ne’er-do-wells who are motivated to violate norms.
Moreover, laws and norms are not always consistent with each other. One need only
consider the laws banning marijuana use to acknowledge this truism.
Legitimacy is another source of motivation for intrinsic control.88 Tyler’s classic
study of the legitimacy of the court system89 showed that people are more willing to
comply with a law or recognize the validity of a decision, even against self-interest,
if they believe the law or decision was arrived at in a procedurally just fashion in
which those affected were afforded a fair chance to be heard and like cases were
treated alike. However, people’s trust in authority figures or institutions may falter,
or, as in the case of highway speed limits, a norm—e.g., “it’s okay to go ten miles
over the limit, everyone else does”—or personal need or convenience may dictate
non-compliance with rules despite the legitimacy of the institution that made the
rule.
Motivational law both reinforces other sources of motivation for intrinsic control
and may fill the gap where other sources of motivation prove inadequate to bring
85

See Tom R. Tyler, Patrick E. Callahan & Jeffrey Frost, Armed, and Dangerous (?):
Motivating Rule Adherence Among Agents of Social Control, 41 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 457, 46263 (2007); TYLER, supra note 3, at 165.
86

Cf. W. Bradley Wendel, Morality, Motivation and the Professionalism Movement, 52
S.C. L. REV. 557, 593 (2001).
87

See Note, Shame, Stigma and Crime: Evaluating the Efficacy of Shaming Sanctions in
Criminal Law, 116 HARV. L. REV. 2186, 2207 (2003) (“Shaming can be a cheaper and more
effective punishment than imprisonment for low-level offenders.”); Christopher S. Elmendorf,
Ideas, Incentives, Gifts and Governance: Toward Conservation Stewardship of Private Land,
in Cultural and Psychological Perspective, 2003 U. ILL. L. REV. 423, 461 n.215 (2003)
(summarizing social psychological studies of the importance of reference and peer group
influence in social control). The effectiveness of shunning or the threat of shunning in
motivating behavior probably has neurobiological underpinnings. Cf. Naomi I. Eisenberger,
Matthew D. Lieberman, & Kipling D. Williams, Does Rejection Hurt?: An fMRI Study of
Social Exclusion, SCIENCE, Oct. 10, 2003, at 290 (finding emotional pain experienced due to
social exclusion involves the same portions of the brain as physical pain).
88

See Richard Fallon, Legitimacy and The Constitution, 118 HARV. L. REV. 1787, 1852-53
(2005); see also Cary Coglianese, Legitimacy and Corporate Governance, 32 DEL. J. CORP. L.
159, 160 (2007).
89

TYLER, supra note 3, 20-22, and authorities cited by Tyler. Tyler’s later work has given
more detailed guidance regarding those factors that contribute to the perception of fairness.
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about compliance or tend to induce non-compliance. Norms and legitimacy may
drive compliance with laws that are consistent with normative behavior and imposed
by a trusted authority, but laws can either reinforce or counteract normative
influences by creating incentives or the perception of incentives for compliance,
making it easier or more feasible for people to comply, reinforcing trust in the source
of the law, or mandating or inducing people to act in ways that make them more
inclined to comply.
III. HOW MOTIVATIONAL LAW WORKS
A. Motivational Law as Intrinsic Social Control
Macchiavelli observed that governments cannot govern without the goodwill of
their subjects.90 Tom R. Tyler has echoed this insight: “[T]he viability of legal
authorities in a democratic society depends upon their ability to secure voluntary
compliance with the law. . . .The legal system has, at best, a limited ability to compel
people to obey the law and is heavily dependent on widespread voluntary
cooperation with judicial directives.”91
Tyler and others have distinguished extrinsic from intrinsic social controls.92
Extrinsic, or instrumental, controls include traditional command-and-control
structures which function through sanctions and the threat of sanctions, and
sometimes through reward and the promise of reward. Intrinsic controls function
through the self-motivation of citizens to comply with rules, independent of
sanctions or reward.
Command-and-control structures strain available resources; pointing guns at
people to coerce compliance demands reliable manpower and firepower, and
governments cannot point guns at all of their citizens, all the time. Extrinsic controls
cannot succeed in the absence of some degree of intrinsic control. Intrinsic controls
back up extrinsic controls when extrinsic controls fail, and reduce the likelihood that
they will fail.
Motivational law is central to this back-up system of intrinsic controls. It is
supposed to increase motivation to comply with regulatory law, but what motivates
compliance with the motivational law? If motivational law merely shifted a
government’s gun-pointing from coercing compliance with one type of law I have
called “regulatory” to coercing compliance with another type of law called
“motivational,” motivational law would make little sense. One answer is that
motivational law increases the probability of compliance with regulatory law by
increasing the number of ways in which, and often, the number of persons through
whom, compliance can be achieved.
As an example, women’s compliance with the motivational laws of hijab is
supposed to protect them by affecting men’s behavior, causing men to be more
90

See NICCOLO MACHIAVELLI, THE PRINCE Ch. III (Harvey C. Mansfield trans., Univ. of
Chicago Press 2d ed. 1998) (“Although one may be very strong in armed forces, yet in
entering a province one has always need of the goodwill of the natives.”).
91
Tom R. Tyler, Multiculturalism and the Willingness of Citizens to Defer to Law and to
Legal Authorities, 25 LAW & SOC. INQ. 983, 984 (2000) (emphasis in the original).
92

For a recent summary of the literature drawing this distinction, see Tyler, Callahan &
Frost, supra note 85, at 461-63.
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motivated to obey laws against adultery, rape and sexual abuse, which according to
my definition are “regulatory” laws.93 A Muslim woman might be motivated to
comply with the rules of hijab because she genuinely feels that compliance will
protect her from rape and abuse, but she could have several other motives. She
might otherwise risk punishment by her government, as in theocratic Iran, or believe
she would be punished by Allah. She might comply because she fears shunning, as a
statement of her ethnic identity, or because she believes in the legitimacy of Allah’s
wisdom and that Allah’s purpose in commanding her to comply with hijab is
irrelevant. She might comply with hijab because she is motivated by her compliance
with other motivational laws such as salat (the Islamic prayer ritual repeated five
times daily), by habit, or by self-interest, e.g., protection from the sun.
Why, then, use hijab as motivational law, rather than simply relying on threat of
punishment, Allah’s legitimacy, fear of community rejection, habit or self-interest to
obtain compliance with Islamic laws on extramarital sex, rape and sexual abuse?
Men may not respond to threats of punishment, they may not believe in Allah or in
the likelihood of divine punishment (or that belief might be insufficient deterrent to
affect their behavior), and community rejection, habit and self-interest often fail to
prevent sexual abuse and other conduct targeted by the laws of hijab. Hijab is
supposed to provide a second set of controls if men otherwise cannot control
themselves.
B. Psychological Mechanisms of Motivational Law
1. Cognitive Dissonance
Behavioral and cognitive reasons for compliance include behavioral
conditioning, e.g., if the law mandates conduct which individuals have learned to
regard as normative or that has become habitual, or otherwise embedded in the
subconscious mind;94 and neural structure,95 if the law mandates behaviors consistent
with those selected by the cognitive and decision-making apparatuses of the human
brain under similar circumstances.96
93

See text at note 73.

94

See Jeremy Blumenthal, Law and the Emotions: The Problems of Affective Forecasting,
80 IND. L. J. 155 (2005); Adam J. Hirsch, Evolutionary Theories of Common Law Efficiency:
Reasons for (Cognitive) Skepticism, 32 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 425 (2005); MICHAEL A. BISHOP &
J.D. TROUT, EPISTEMOLOGY AND THE PSYCHOLOGY OF HUMAN JUDGMENT (2005); Alfred F.
MacKay, Human Motivation: The Inadequacy of Economists’ Models, 10 HOFSTRA L. REV.
441 (1981).
95

Neuroeconomics is casting new light on how the functioning of the brain affects the
perception and efficacy of deterrents and rewards. See generally John Cassidy, Mind Games:
What Neuroeconomics Tells Us About Money and the Brain, NEW YORKER, Sept. 18, 2006, at
30; STEVEN R. QUARTZ & TERRENCE J. SEJNOWSKI, LIARS, LOVERS AND HEROES: WHAT THE
NEW BRAIN SCIENCE REVEALS ABOUT HOW WE BECOME WHO WE ARE (2002); PAUL W.
GLIMCHER, DECISIONS, UNCERTAINTY AND THE BRAIN: THE SCIENCE OF NEUROECONOMICS
(2003).
96
See Terrence Chorvat & Kevin McCabe, Neuroeconomics and Rationality, 80 CHI.KENT L. Rev. 1235, 1252 (2005); Terrence Chorvat, Kevin McCabe & Vernon Smith, Law
and Neuroeconomics, 13 SUP. CT. ECON. REV. 35, 54-61 (2005); Peter A. Alces, On
Discovering Doctrine: “Justice” in Contract Agreement, 83 WASH. U. L. Q. 471, 477-78
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Cognitive dissonance may be the key cognitive mechanism at work in
motivational law. According to Festinger’s original theory of cognitive dissonance,97
cognitive inconsistencies of sufficient magnitude induce an aversive motivational
state—cognitive dissonance—in which an individual will attempt to alter his or her
cognition or behavior so as to reduce the inconsistency. More recent studies suggest
cognitive discrepancy motivates people committed to a behavior or belief to engage
in information processing that supports their commitment. The discrepancy
undermines the potential for effective action consistent with the commitment, in that
action undertaken in a conflicted mind-state is not likely to be as effective as action
undertaken in a condition of certainty.98 If dissonant information overcomes a
certain threshold, the level of which depends on the strength of the commitment and
the volume and strength of the non-dissonant information, the individual will be
motivated to alter her behavior or belief.99
Motivational laws function in a number of ways that can be explained in terms of
cognitive dissonance theory. Some work by screening out discrepant information.
Political censorship laws are supposed to screen out discrepant information and
enable propaganda and indoctrination to build commitment to actions consistent with
those mandated by the regime, and belief supporting that commitment. Obscenity
laws and religious laws such as hijab are supposed to prevent emotional arousal from
visual stimuli. They also, in theory, enable religious institutions and other sources of
moral instruction to build commitment to beliefs that upon arousal, would create
dissonance and thereby restrain abusive action. The consideration requirement for
formation of a contract is supposed to create a discrepancy between one’s act in
signing a contract that pronounces its seriousness through the recital of
consideration, and any internal reservations about the seriousness of that act, so that
if a party to a contract in the process of formation harbors such reservations, he or
she will be motivated to take some action to reduce or eliminate the discrepancy,
e.g., by disclosing those reservations or declining to sign the contract. Similarly,
military disciplinary rules are supposed to create a commitment to—indeed, a habit
of—obeying orders that is sufficiently powerful to motivate soldiers to do so even in
the face of information in battle that seems to make such obedience foolhardy.
Motivational law has a built-in advantage as a tool to build commitment to
compliance with regulatory laws, to the extent it is enforceable by sanctions.
Motivational law takes advantage of the motivation created by the threat of sanctions
to build commitment to a motivational behavior that, in turn, builds commitment to
the behavior that is the objective of regulatory law. For instance, if a soldier fails to
salute a superior officer, the soldier may be punished. The threat of punishment
(2005); Nina Mazar & Dan Ariely, Dishonesty in Everyday Life and Its Policy Implications,
2006 J. PUB. POL’Y & MKTG. 117 (2006).
97

LEON FESTINGER, A THEORY OF COGNITIVE DISSONANCE (1957).

98

Eddie Harmon-Jones, A Cognitive Dissonance Theory Perspective on Persuasion, in
THE PERSUASION HANDBOOK: DEVELOPMENTS IN THEORY AND PRACTICE 99, 107 (James Price
Dillard & Michael Pfau eds., 2002). The neural bases for cognitive dissonance theory are
further explored in a recent collection of articles on the subject. EDDIE HARMON-JONES &
PIOTR WINKIELMAN, SOCIAL NEUROSCIENCE: INTEGRATING BIOLOGICAL AND PSYCHOLOGICAL
EXPLANATIONS OF SOCIAL BEHAVIOR (Eddie Harmon-Jones & Piotr Winkielman eds., 2007).
99

Harmon-Jones, supra note 98, at 107.
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motivates soldiers to salute, and saluting, in turn, builds commitment to compliance
with the orders of the officers whom they salute. Disobeying someone whom one
regularly salutes, on pain of punishment for failure to salute, would create significant
cognitive dissonance, so soldiers will be motivated instead to engage in information
processing that supports their commitment to compliance.
Cognitive dissonance, however, also can weaken compliance with motivational
law. For example, speed limits on the highways have a motivational function. Many
highways designed to safely accommodate traffic moving at 80 m.p.h. are posted
with 55 or 60 m.p.h. speed limits, ostensibly for the purpose of ensuring that drivers
do not drive at an unsafe speed and thereby endanger others. However, drivers going
70 m.p.h. know, or at least, believe based on their perception of the highway itself
that their speed is not really unsafe. Even traffic officers share this belief, so they
typically choose to ticket drivers whose speed is more than five or ten m.p.h. beyond
the speed limit rather than drivers two or three m.p.h. over the limit. The
motivational speed limits are ignored due to the dissonance created by the
discrepancy between designed-for-80 and speed-limit-60.
2. Shaming, Moral Community-Building, and Regulatory Communities
Empirical evidence points, albeit equivocally, to the “moral community” or
“reference group” as a key element in the functioning of motivational law.100 Studies
in regulatory theory have revealed that shaming and the threat of shaming appear to
function better as a deterrent than the threat of physical punishment, but the threat of
shaming alters behavior only if the individual is concerned about his or her
reputation in a community.101
Many motivational laws rely on community-building and the threat of shaming
for their effectiveness. Certainly it is an element in the effectiveness of military
disciplinary rules that they render disobedience of orders shameful in the eyes of
one’s fellow soldiers. Religious codes of dress, ritual and diet function within
religious moral communities and also serve to bind those communities together. If
the moral community dissolves, so does compliance with its motivational laws.
Compliance with Jewish dietary laws, for example, is limited to a small minority of
American Jews, mostly in Orthodox religious communities. Meanwhile, the
American Jewish community is diminishing in strength as a moral community,
though it remains an ethnic minority. Shunning and excommunication are
formalized versions of shaming used in some religious communities, though they are
less common today in mainstream religion.102
The threat of humiliation often leads wrongdoers to attempt to conceal their
actions despite the lack of formal punishment. Communities of the religiously
observant typically exist within a larger society, and concealment—e.g., of domestic
abuse—may be condoned and even abetted by others within the community in order
to avoid a collective loss of face.103
100

See infra Part IV.B.

101

See Toni L. Massaro, Shame, Culture and American Criminal Law, 89 MICH. L. REV.
1880, 1883 (1991).
102

See generally infra note 114.

103

See Massaro, supra note 101, Part IV.C.

https://engagedscholarship.csuohio.edu/clevstlrev/vol56/iss1/6

24

2008]

MOTIVATIONAL LAW

135

The success of a non-coercive “soft law” approach104 to secular regulation
depends on whether the regulated actor is motivated to cooperate with its regulators
in order to save face among, or conform to the behavior of, his or her peers or based
on positive feelings toward the regulators. Soft law works because it motivates
regulated actors to comply with regulatory law, and it motivates regulated actors
better if they are part of a regulatory community. That regulatory community may
consist of peers who are subject to the same regulatory laws, or it may consist of
both peers and the regulators themselves. By making the regulated actor fear being
shamed in the eyes of that regulatory community, soft law motivates compliance
with hard law.
Thus, nursing home operators are more likely to comply with regulatory
requirements if they find non-compliance shameful in the eyes of their peers than if
they are threatened with coercive action.105 Some corporations in the forest products
industry comply with forest certification rules drafted by a non-profit group with
industry participation, not because the rules are favorable to the industry, but because
they “could not afford to get a bad name . . . .”106
Mandatory arrest of alleged domestic abusers tends to increase, not decrease,
domestic violence among men who do not find arrest shameful, while it reduces
domestic violence among those who do.107 Compliance with a request or demand is
more likely if the subject likes the requester or perceives that others comply.108
104

The dichotomy between hard and soft law is problematic. See TYLER, supra note 3.
Regulators seldom take a uniform hard or soft law approach when they interface with the
persons whose activities they are responsible for regulating. More often bank examiners or
nursing home inspectors employed by the same regulatory agency, for example, resemble the
old cartoon characters Mutt and Jeff or a “good cop, bad cop” routine, some bearing goodwill
and “soft law” and others readily brandishing the club of “hard law” and enforcement action.
Whether the good cops or bad cops will prevail in administrative agency-level decisionmaking depends a great degree on the political and policy persuasions of those in higher
positions within the agency. Moreover, the decision whether to send out good cops or bad
cops, or some of each, to examine, inspect or monitor a regulated actor is often a conscious
judgment made by a supervisor based on input from prior examinations or inspections. A
supervisor who perceives the regulated actor as motivated to comply, and therefore likely to
act cooperatively and in good faith with respect to the regulatory process, is likely to send an
examiner or inspector who takes a motivational “New Governance” approach, while if the
supervisor making the assignment perceives the regulated actor as motivated not to comply,
and therefore untrustworthy, he or she is likely to assign an examiner or inspector who takes a
more adversarial “hard law” approach. Id.
105

Makkai and Braithwaite found that what they term “reintegrative shaming” was more
effective than stigmatization, i.e., labeling the individual as evil (as through coercive action or
the threat of such action), in obtaining increased legal compliance by nursing homes. See Toni
Makkai & John Braithwaite, Reintegrative Shaming and Compliance with Regulatory
Standards, 32 CRIMINOLOGY 361, 361 (1994).
106

See Errol E. Meidinger, The New Environmental Law: Forest Certification, 10 BUFF.
ENVTL. L.J. 211, 299 (2002) (quoting forest industry representative as saying his company
would comply with standards on forest certification drafted by the Forest Stewardship
Council, a non-profit group).
107
LAWRENCE W. SHERMAN ET AL., POLICING DOMESTIC VIOLENCE: EXPERIMENTS
DILEMMAS 1-2 (1992); Makkai & Braithwaite, supra note 105, at 363-64.
108

AND

Robert B. Cialdini & Melanie R. Trost, Social Influence: Social Norms, Conformity,
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Compliance does increase when threats are made, but only if the threats are public
and the opportunity to comply is private, suggesting that shame rather than fear is the
principal factor in increasing compliance.109 If shaming is ongoing and does not
offer the wrongdoer a means of reintegration, as through a ceremony celebrating a
return to compliance, the ties of the wrongdoer with the relevant group are weakened
and the wrongdoer simply decides he or she doesn’t care anymore what the group
thinks.
C. Motivational Law as Legitimacy-Builder in Religious and Secular Governance
People are more likely to comply with a rule or principle if they regard the
authority issuing the rule or principle as legitimate. Motivational law, in turn, can
contribute to building legitimacy. The term “legitimacy”, however, often is misused
in ways that obscure its motivational function.110 Tom R. Tyler defines legitimacy as
“a conception of obligation to obey any commands an authority issues so long as that
authority is acting within appropriate limits.”111 “‘Legitimacy’ connotes a faith or
trust in individuals, procedures, and/or organizations. It denotes the ability to make
people think that a claim to obedience is self-evident . . . .”112
When the term “legitimacy” is used to refer to a constitutional provision, statute
or judicial decision, it is not only different from the use of the term to refer to a
government or other authority, it is a misuse of the term that obscures its

and Compliance, in II HANDBOOK OF SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY 151, 151-81 (Daniel T. Gilbert et
al. eds., 4th ed. 1998).
109

Amy Kaplan & Joachim Krueger, Compliance After Threat: Self-Affirmation or SelfPresentatation [sic]? 4 CURRENT RESEARCH IN SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY 178, 179, 192 (1999),
available at http://www.uiowa.edu/~grpproc/crisp/crisp.4.7.htm.
See also Christopher S.
Elmendorf, Ideas, Incentives, Gifts and Governance: Toward Conservation Stewardship of
Private Land, in Cultural and Psychological Perspective, 2003 U. ILL. L. REV. 423, 461-62
(2003).
110

Richard Fallon distinguishes among legal, sociological and moral uses of the term
“legitimacy.” Richard H. Fallon, Jr., Legitimacy and the Constitution, 118 HARV. L. REV.
1787, 1794-96 (2005), citing MAX WEBER, ECONOMY AND SOCIETY 33-38 (Guenther Roth &
Claus Wittich, eds., Ephraim Fischoff et al. trans., 1968) and Joseph Bensman, Max Weber’s
Concept of Legitimacy: An Evaluation, in CONFLICT AND CONTROL: CHALLENGE TO
LEGITIMACY OF MODERN GOVERNMENTS 17 (Arthur J. Vidich & Ronald M. Glassman eds.,
1979). Fallon’s description of the sociological use of the term is off the mark. According to
Fallon, “[w]hen legitimacy is measured in sociological terms, a constitutional regime,
governmental institution, or official decision possesses legitimacy in a strong sense insofar as
the relevant public regards it as justified, appropriate, or otherwise deserving of support for
reasons beyond fear of sanctions or mere hope for personal reward.” Id. at 1795 (emphasis in
original). However, people may harbor a variety of motives for complying with an order of a
government apart from fear of sanctions and hope of reward, some of which have nothing to
do with the government’s legitimacy. People may comply out of fear of shunning or shaming
by a relevant community or reference group, or due to inculcated norms or habits, or out of
self-interest, which is not synonymous with the “hope of reward.” See also infra note 113.
111

TYLER, supra note 3, at 26.

112

Paul H. Brietzke, Law, Legitimacy and Coercion: One View from Law and Economics,
25 VAL. U. L. REV. 343, 344 n.2 (1990).
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motivational meaning.113 A statute or court or agency decision cannot be
“legitimate” or “illegitimate,” but it can be legal or illegal, moral or immoral.
However, an authority is legitimate if a relevant group is generally motivated to
accept its claim to obedience without questioning its legal or moral justification.
What is important here is that some laws possess the purpose or function of
increasing legitimacy by instilling faith and trust in an authority, whether
government or god, legislature or court, institution or individual, in order to motivate
people to obey the orders and decisions of that authority. These laws are
motivational laws. For example, as discussed above in Part II.B, the requirement of
due process has a motivational function that serves to reinforce the legitimacy of the
judicial system, and the laws of the United Kingdom and other monarchies regarding
royal privileges exist largely to lend legitimacy to the government in order to
motivate citizens to obey its other laws.
Religious lawmakers, like secular ones, confront the problem of establishing and
preserving legitimacy, but they must resolve it differently. In religious organizations
other than theocracies and cults, instrumental motivation must involve divine
sanctions and rewards, and functions only to the extent that adherents have
internalized a belief in the existence and efficacy of such sanctions and rewards.
Only the true believer will be deterred by the risk of divine punishment, and belief in
the divine—the “legitimacy” of divine authority in a sociological sense—is a
variable and fickle thing susceptible to doubt.
Not all religious laws lack earthly coercive enforcement. Theocracies, of course,
have the ability to resort to coercion because they hold the powers of government,
and cults, though they are not governments, have coercive power through both
mental and physical control of their members when such power in the hands of a
private organization is tolerated by government or when government is too weak to
interfere with it. In religious communities such as the Mennonites, Mormons,
Jehovah’s Witnesses and Korean churches, the threat of excommunication and
shunning may be effective to deter violations of religious laws,114 though such
sanctions are little used today in mainstream Judaism115 and Christianity.116 Islam
113
Fallon elevates misuse of the word “legitimate” to alternative uses. Fallon, supra note
110, at 1794. If “[t]hat which is lawful is also legitimate,” there can be no such thing as “legal
legitimacy.” Id. Conduct either is lawful or it is not, though the term “illegitimate” is often
misused as a synonym for “unlawful” or to give emphasis to how clearly unlawful something
is. Fallon makes a similar mistake in discussing moral “legitimacy:” “When the term is used
in a moral sense, legitimacy is a function of moral justifiability or respect-worthiness.” Id. at
1796. The fact that some misuse the term as a synonym for “morally justified” does not make
the usage proper.
114

See generally Paul v. Watchtower Bible and Tract Soc’y, Inc., 819 F.2d 875, 877 (9th
Cir. 1987) (discussing the “disfellowship” of church member); Bear v. Reformed Mennonite
Church, 341 A.2d 105, 106 (Pa. 1975) (discussing community-wide ostracism of critic of
church doctrine); Lide v. Miller, 573 S.W. 2d 614 (Tex. Civ. App. 1978) (discussing alleged
ruin of dental practice following shunning of dentist by church); Justin K. Miller, Comment,
Damned if You Do, Damned if You Don’t: Religious Shunning and the Free Exercise Clause,
137 U. PA. L. REV. 271 (1988); Daniel Bahk, Note, Excommunication and Shunning: The
Effect on Korean Churches in America as a Networking Social Structure, 3 RUTGERS J.L. &
RELIGION 4 (2001).
115
Excommunication, or cherem, virtually ended outside the ultra-Orthodox sects of
Judaism after the Enlightenment as local Jewish communities in Europe lost their prior self-
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continues to use excommunication (takfir) as in the case of Salman Rushdie,
although a body of Islamic scholars convened by King Abdullah II of Jordan in 2005
issued a statement opposing the practice.117
In law-based religions such as Judaism and Islam, legitimacy depends on the
rulemaker’s convincing adherents or the religious hierarchy that he or she either is
authorized by the divine sovereign to make rules, or that he or she is more expert
than others in interpreting and applying the words of the divine sovereign. In Iran,
rulemaking authority is vested in the Council of Experts, a body of 86 scholars of the
Qu’ran and Ahadith. Hasidic rebbes were originally selected based on knowledge of
the Bible, Talmud and medieval religious codes and commentaries. In Roman
Catholicism, the elected Pope is considered to be the authorized intermediary
between God and man. In non-law-based religions such as evangelical Christianity,
a preacher’s charisma is more important in motivating compliance than practices
institutionalized by motivational law. Motivational laws are marginalized and the
search for religious experience and congregational dynamics predominate.118
The process of choosing and replacing religious rulemakers also differs in
theocracies. In a religious hierarchy based on expertise, a fortiori only other experts
are qualified to make decisions about who possesses the necessary qualifications to
be a rulemaker. Rulemaking in law-based religions therefore is inherently undemocratic. Such hierarchies also are self-generating, an endless sequence of experts
choosing other experts.
The second issue rulemakers must confront is how to proceed in making rules.
There are no elected legislatures in Judaism or Islam, apart from theocratic Islamic
states in which religious “experts” have veto power regarding candidacies, and the
objective of the theocratic regime may ultimately be to restore the caliphate.119
Moreover, in both religions, in theory the rules of religious law have already been set
governing status.
116
For example, Catholic bishops rejected excommunication of Catholic politicians who
support funding for abortions as “counterproductive.” See Thomas J. Reese, S.J., Bishops
Meet in Baltimore, AMERICA, Nov. 25, 1989, available at http://woodstock.georgetown.edu/
church_studies/reese/america/nc8911.htm.
117
The statement was called the “Amman Message” and is available at http://www.amman
message.com/ (last visited Aug. 24, 2007).
118

In religions such as Reconstructionist Judaism and many of the Protestant
denominations (e.g., Lutheranism, Presbyterianism, Unitarianism, and the Society of Friends
(Quakers), individual congregations are given considerable autonomy in making their own
rules. Even Martin Luther, however, intended that his liturgical innovations, principally the
singing of Psalms in the vernacular, would “reinforce popular belief in Evangelical theology.”
Harold J. Berman, The Spiritualization of Secular Law: The Impact of the Lutheran
Reformation, 14 J.L. & RELIGION 313, 322 n.29 (1999).
119
In Iran, the elected Council of Experts consists of eighty-six members. The Council of
Experts elects the President, who appoints the Guardian Council. The Guardian Council, so
named because it is the “guardian” of the Islamic Revolution, decides who can be a candidate
for the Council of Experts, acting as a filter through which only a handful of candidates who
are considered sufficiently observant and knowledgeable about Islam can pass. Pepe Escobar,
The Roving Eye: The Ultimate Martyr, ASIA TIMES, Mar. 31, 2006, available at
http://www/atimes.com/atimes/Middle_East/HC31Ak03.html. For an insightful look at the
political situation in Iran, see id.
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both in divine writings and by ancient and medieval scholars,120 it remains only for
religious courts121 and prominent scholars to interpret and apply them.122
Contemporary rulemaking in law-based religions is delegated to a religious judiciary
and to influential bodies of scholars.
Secular governmental rulemakers must be concerned with the process of
contemporary rulemaking, such as the rule drafting process, soliciting public input,
and publicizing new rules in the interest both of compliance and due process. The
job of rule formulation and publicizing new rules has largely been completed in
Judaism and Islam. Religions primarily must be concerned about the preservation of
rules, while governments must be concerned with their formulation.
Secular regulators possess means of compelling enforcement that organized
religions do not. A rabbi or an imam cannot go to a U.S. court and obtain an
injunction to compel a shop owner, even one of their congregants, to sell only kosher
or halal meat. A government or governmental agency like the United States Food
and Drug Administration, on the other hand, could obtain an injunction to compel the
same shop owner to sell only meat that satisfies secular standards governing
slaughter and preparation.
IV. FAILURES AND SUCCESSES OF MOTIVATIONAL LAW: DOES IT REALLY WORK?
A. Motivational Law’s Failures
A glance at the examples of motivational law in Part II of this Article should
leave the reader wondering, “Does motivational law ever actually work?”
- Parties to contracts routinely ignore pro forma recitals of “in consideration for
one dollar receipt of which is hereby acknowledged,” and the evils of people not
understanding the seriousness of the contracts they sign persist.123

120
In Judaism, most of the existing body of religious law was created by the rabbis of the
Mishnah and Talmud, who lived between 200 B.C.E. and 500 C.E., and by medieval
commentators who followed them. This body of religious law was codified between the 12th
and 16th centuries, most authoritatively in the Shulhan Arukh (“Set Table”), completed by
Rabbi Joseph Caro in 1555, and in The Mappah (“Tablecloth”), a set of notes to the Shulhan
Arukh written by Rabbi Moses Isserles of Krakow in the late 16th century which reflected the
differences between the Sephardic and Ashkenazic Jewish traditions. JUDAH GRIBETZ ET AL.,
THE TIMETABLE OF JEWISH HISTORY 165 (1993). For another important codification of Jewish
law, see MOSES MAIMONIDES, THE CODE OF MAIMONIDES: MISHNEH TORAH (Menachem
Kellner trans., Yale Univ. Press 2004) (1135).
121

In Judaism, a religious court is called a beit din, or “house of justice” and consists of
three members. Islam has Shari’a courts with a similar function.
122
Regarding the principles of Jewish law as construed by scholars, see José Faur, The
Fundamental Principles of Jewish Jurisprudence, 12 N.Y.U. J. INT’L L. & POL. 225 (1979).
In Islam, the Qu’ran and the memorized teachings of Muhammed and his followers (Ahadith)
are construed according to rules of Islamic jurisprudence called fiqh, of which there are
several schools of thought (Maddhab). For a more detailed discussion of the sources of
Islamic law, see Ahmed Souaiaia, On the Sources of Islamic Law and Practices, 20 J.L. &
RELIGION 123 (2004).
123

Consumers routinely fail to read or understand the substantive terms of contracts.
Robert A. Hillman, Online Boilerplate: Would Mandatory Website Disclosure of E-Standard
Terms Backfire?, 104 MICH. L. REV. 837, 841-42 (2006); Jeff Sovern, Toward a New Model
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- Evidence that obscenity laws have impacted either the demand for pornography
or the frequency of rape and other forms of aggression against women is at best
equivocal.124
- Military disciplinary rules failed to prevent the torture of prisoners at Abu
Ghraib.
- Only a small percentage of Jews and Catholics comply with religious laws on
dress, diet, prayer and ritual. Islamic religious laws on dress, diet, prayer and ritual
have become political rallying points for fundamentalism and theocratic rule.
- An industry of predatory “consumer credit counseling” businesses that used
deceptive tactics to sell debtors “debt management plans” was given additional
leverage over consumers by BAPCPA’s credit counseling requirement,125 and the
number of consumer bankruptcies is again rising rapidly despite BAPCPA.126
- Public support for the British royal family—and presumably, therefore, the
impact of royalty as a motivator for compliance with law—is at a new low.127
Though widely used, motivational law often fails. Moreover, where the linkage
between motivational and regulatory law is weak or ambiguous, or where the
regulatory law is not perceived as yielding benefits commensurate with the burdens
imposed by motivational law, social tensions result. Abu Ghraib, the controversy
concerning obscenity laws and pornography, and the debate within Islam over the
wearing of hijab are three examples.
One common barrier to motivational law’s effectiveness is what might be termed
the “dilution” problem. The Pledge of Allegiance that most American public schools
require students to recite at the beginning of the school day often provokes giggles
rather than patriotism because it is not integrated into a system of motivational laws
that pervades students’ lives. Any motivational effect is lost, diluted beyond
recognition by the other 99% of the school day’s activities.
Many other barriers exist to motivational law’s effective use in governance in the
United States, of which the following are a few:
1. The “hard law” tradition of regulation. A tradition of command-and-control
and “hard law” regulation, though changing, still prevails in many regulatory
agencies.
2. The cult of notice. American laws rooted in the concept of due process
emphasize the giving of notice rather than its effectiveness in generating motivation.
of Consumer Protection: The Problem of Inflated Transaction Costs, 47 WM. & MARY L.
REV. 1635, 1657-59 (2006).
124

See supra note 21.

125

Gross & Block-Lieb, supra note 45, at 554-59. In fairness, the predatory practices long
predated BAPCPA, and BAPCPA purported to regulate the industry by giving the Executive
Office of U.S. Trustees approval authority over credit counseling agencies. However,
regulation was a hollow promise, since the approval process relies heavily on certification by
trade organizations rather than effective monitoring of the business practices of credit
counseling agencies. Id.
126

Case filings by individuals or households with consumer debt increased 48.34% to
391,105 for the six months ending June 30, 2007, compared to 272,602 cases filed in the six
months ending June 30, 2006. AMERICAN BANKRUPTCY INSTITUTE UPDATE (Am. Bankr. Inst.),
Aug. 16, 2007.
127

See supra note 59.
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An extreme example of this cult of notice is the fine print disclosures of credit terms
flashed on the television screen for impossibly brief moments, all in compliance with
the Truth in Lending Act.128
3. The pictorial superiority effect. Studies of cognition demonstrate that the
written word is less effective than pictures to communicate concepts and motivate a
response.129 American regulators, however, consistently use the written word to
motivate consumers. Product warning labels are notoriously ineffective, in part
because they use words rather than pictures to convey information about the product.
B. Does Religious Motivational Law Work? The Hellfire Controversy
Probably no aspect of motivational law’s effectiveness has undergone more study
by social scientists than whether observance of religious law motivates people to
refrain from violating criminal laws. Six principal hypotheses have been advanced
by sociologists concerning religiosity and delinquency:
The Hellfire Hypothesis posits that a belief in supernatural punishments and
rewards deters criminal behavior and promotes normative behavior.130 Religious
belief, though not necessarily religious activity, should be associated with a
reduction in delinquency with respect to crimes disapproved of by religious
teachings.
Social control (or social bonding) theory:131 Religion promotes compliance even
with laws that are not a topic of religious teachings. Participation in religion is a
form of attachment, commitment and involvement which increases the stakes in
conformity and encourages the belief that societal norms should be obeyed.
The “anti-asceticism” theory: Religiosity, measured by participation in religious
activities, has a stronger inverse effect on actions such as alcohol and drug use that
run counter to religious traditions of asceticism but are condoned or only
ambiguously condemned by secular influences.132
128
Truth in Lending Act, 15 U.S.C. §1601 (1968). See Robert A. Hillman & Jeffrey J.
Rachlinski, Standard-Form Contracting in the Electronic Age, 77 N.Y.U. L. REV. 429, 43233, 446 (2002) ("Businesses . . . know[] that consumers reliably, predictably, and completely
fail to read the terms employed in standard-form contracts. . . . Businesses also can create
boilerplate that is difficult to read by using small print, a light font, and all-capital lettering and
by burying important terms in the middle of the form."); Alan Schwartz & Louis L. Wilde,
Imperfect Information in Markets for Contract Terms: The Examples of Warranties and
Security Interests, 69 VA. L. REV. 1387, 1389 (1983) ("[C]onsumers may not understand the
legal relationships that their purchase contracts create because they do not read the language in
those contracts. Firms have an incentive to exploit this ignorance by using 'hidden' terms that
will disadvantage consumers if circumstances cause these terms to be invoked.").
129
This is called the “pictorial superiority effect.” See Douglas L. Nelson et al., Pictorial
Superiority Effect, 2 J. EXPERIMENTAL PSYCHOL.: HUM. LEARNING & MEMORY 523, 523-528
(1976); ALLAN PAIVIO, IMAGERY AND VERBAL PROCESSES (1971); ALLAN PAIVIO, MENTAL
REPRESENTATIONS: A DUAL CODING APPROACH (Oxford psychology series; no. 9 1990).
130

See generally infra note 137.

131

TRAVIS HIRSCHI, CAUSES OF DELINQUENCY (1969). Notably, Hirschi in 1990 moved
away from social control theory and proposed a “self-control” theory that has not gained as
much acceptance. Id.
132
John K. Cochran & Ronald L. Akers, Beyond Hellfire: An Exploration of the Variable
Effects of Religiosity on Adolescent Marijuana and Alcohol Use, 26 J. RES. IN CRIME &
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Theory of secular social disorganization: “[W]hen secular moral guidelines are
unavailable, in flux, or have lost their authority and hence their power to compel, the
salience of religious proscriptions is enhanced.”133 Religion should have negligible
additional impact on delinquency if secular social condemnation of an act is strong,
but should make a difference if secular social condemnation is nonexistent or
ambiguous.
Arousal theory: Religious activity satisfies the individual’s neurobiological need
for stimulation and prevents the boredom, or lack of neurological arousal, that leads
individuals to engage in criminal activity.134
“Moral community” theory:135 Religiosity has greater effect on individuals who
are surrounded by, or affiliated with, a “moral community” in which their moral
behavior will be reinforced and delinquency will result in shame and
embarrassment.136
In 1969, the first major empirical study of the relationship between religiosity
and delinquency gave no support to any of these hypotheses. In Hellfire and
Delinquency137 Hirschi and Stark concluded that neither church attendance nor
professed belief in supernatural sanctions bore a statistically significant relationship
DELINQ. 198 (1989).
133

Charles R. Tittle & Michael R. Welch, Religiosity and Deviance: Toward a
Contingency Theory of Constraining Effects, 61 SOC. FORCES 653, 672 (1983).
134
John K. Cochran, Peter B. Wood & Bruce J. Arneklev, Is the Religiosity-Delinquency
Relationship Spurious? A Test of Arousal and Social Control Theories, 31 J. RES. IN CRIME &
DELINQ. 92 (1994) (finding arousal and social control theories explained levels of delinquency
better than religiosity); Lee Ellis, Religiosity and Criminality from the Perspective of Arousal
Theory, 24 J. RES. IN CRIME & DELINQ. 215 (1987).
135

Moral community theory is derived from three sources. Under “rational choice” theory,
religious individuals are more likely to feel ashamed as a result of criminal acts and, due to
their involvement in a religious community, are more likely to be embarrassed if those acts
become known; hence they rationally will be deterred from criminal activity. Under
differential association theory, religious individuals will tend to select peers who share their
religiosity, and this, in turn, will tend to socialize them in ways that promote kinds of behavior
valued by their religion. Reference group theory posits a similar dynamic as differential
association theory, but adds that the reference group in which the individual is a member may
start as a non-religious group and take on religious characteristics as individuals within it
become more religious, or it may start as a religious group and lose its religiosity. In other
words, religious belief and observance will tend to spread throughout the reference group once
introduced by a member; or conversely, secular or anti-religious belief and behavior will tend
to spread once introduced by a member.
136

Social control, “rational choice,” differential association and reference group theories
are not inconsistent as applied to religion. Religious individuals instilled with an internal
moral compass feel ashamed if they break the law and, to the extent that they are involved in
religious institutions and a religious community, they will be embarrassed if word of wrongdoing gets out to members of that community. The prospect of shame and embarrassment, in
turn, acts as a deterrent against breaking the law. Differential association and reference group
theories are a way of putting the same concept into the form of a process, though with greater
emphasis on the processes by which non-religious individuals and groups may become
religious.
137

Travis Hirschi & Rodney Stark, Hellfire and Delinquency, 17 SOC. PROBS. 202 (1969).
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to delinquency. Since Hellfire and Delinquency, social scientists have produced an
average of more than two studies per year on the subject of the effect of religious
belief and observance on crime,138 with wildly inconsistent outcomes.139 Most
studies have found some impact,140 though usually either minor or confined to
particular types of crime or particular religious denominations.
A meta-analysis of 60 earlier U.S. studies of religiosity and crime, conducted by
Baier and Wright in 2001, which for the most part excluded non-Christian
subjects,141 lent support only to the moral community142 and anti-asceticism143
theories.144
138
Colin J. Baier & Bradley R.E. Wright, “If You Love Me, Keep My Commandments”: A
Meta-Analysis of the Effect of Religion on Crime, 38 J. RES. IN CRIME & DELINQ. 3, 3 (2001).
139

Some studies concluded that religious belief and observance have no impact on crime.
See, e.g., Lee Ellis & Robert Thompson, Relating Religion, Crime, Arousal and Boredom, 73
SOC. & SOC. RES. 132 (1989). Other studies found a dominant impact. See, e.g., Bruce
Chadwick & Brent Top, Religiosity and Delinquency Among LDS Adolescents, 32 J. FOR SCI.
STUDY RELIGION 51 (1993); John Rohrbaugh & Richard Jessor, Religiosity in Youth: A
Personal Control Against Deviant Behavior, 43 J. PERSONALITY 136 (1975).
140

Even Rodney Stark, one of the authors of Hellfire and Delinquency, 15 years later
recanted his position and announced that “religion has truly potent effects [on delinquency].”
Rodney Stark, Religion and Conformity: Reaffirming a Sociology of Religion, 45 SOC.
ANALYSIS 273, 273 (1984). Stark recanted in dramatic fashion, in his presidential address to
the Association for the Sociology of Religion. Id.
141
Baier and Wright claim, “[i]n analyses not shown here, we found that type of religion
measure had no significant effect on studies’ estimation of the religion-crime association.”
Baier & Wright, supra note 138, at 13. A review of the 60 studies included in their metaanalysis reveals that most if not all excluded Jews and other non-Christian subjects, making
their claim dubious. Whether non-believers who regularly attend synagogue or mosque for
social reasons, or believers who rarely set foot in a mosque or synagogue, would manifest the
same tendencies as Christian church-goers and Christian believers to commit fewer crimes
remains an open question.
142
The difference in crime between church members who go to church regularly and/or
believe in the tenets of the church and church members who do not attend services or believe
in church tenets is greater than the difference in crime between members of the general
population in a generally secular region, the Pacific Northwest, who attend services and/or
believe in religious tenets and members of the general population who do not. This, Baier and
Wright argue, supports the moral community hypothesis, that the deterrent effect of religion
on crime is heightened by living among others who share one’s religiosity. Id. at 14.
143

As predicted by the anti-asceticism theory, religious behavior and/or beliefs (again
Baier and Wright fail to distinguish between them) exert a stronger deterrent effect on
victimless crimes than on crimes against persons or property. Id. Other scholars have argued
that this outcome confirms the secular social disorganization hypothesis, that the effect on
victimless crimes “is the result of religious institutions acting in relative isolation to deter
nonvictim crimes, whereas many social institutions, both religious and secular, act together to
deter person and property crimes.” Id. at 6 (citing Steven Burkett, Religiosity, Beliefs,
Normative Standards and Adolescent Drinking, 41 J. STUD. ON ALCOHOL 662, 663 (1980);
Steven R. Burkett & Mervin White, Hellfire and Delinquency: Another Look, 13 J. FOR SCI.
STUDY RELIGION 455 (1974)).
144
Baier and Wright also found that religious behavior and/or beliefs tend to exert a
stronger deterrent effect on crime among women than men, and a stronger deterrent effect on
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Most studies of religiosity and delinquency suffer from a Christian bias. They
largely represent the work of believers in the Hellfire Hypothesis, for whom the
Hellfire and Delinquency findings “represented a formidable challenge . . . and thus
inspired renewed research activity.”145 Overwhelmingly, their subjects have been
Christians living in the United States, usually students. Most have excluded nonChristians from the results and have measured religiosity solely by church
attendance.146
The few studies on religiosity and delinquency that compare adherents of nonChristian religions147 or non-Christians with Christians, all conducted outside the
United States, provide only equivocal support for any of the theories of motivational
religious law. Israeli studies found that far fewer religiously observant Jews are
imprisoned than non-religiously observant Jews,148 and that religiosity tends to
reduce aggression among Jewish adolescents.149 However, a 1993 study in the
crime among non-whites than among whites. Baier & Wright, supra note 138, at 15.
145

John K. Cochran & Ronald L. Akers, Beyond Hellfire: an Exploration of the Variable
Effects of Religiosity on Adolescent Marijuana and Alcohol Use, 26 J. RES. IN CRIME &
DELINQ. 198, 219 (1989). Cochran and Akers implied that many or most of the believers in
the Hellfire Hypothesis who conducted post-1969 studies that contradicted Hirschi and Stark’s
findings were themselves committed Christians whose personal beliefs were challenged by
what Hirschi and Stark found.
146
These studies also define the dependent variable, crime, inconsistently as including
general index crimes (crimes against persons or property), victimless crimes, or both. The
crimes used in the studies have represented types of conduct prohibited by both religious and
secular law, and the studies have relied extensively on self-reporting of criminal acts, a
precarious method of gathering data about such conduct as domestic abuse and drug use.
147

One of the rare studies of the relationship between religiosity and delinquency to
compare different non-Christian religions compared Jewish and Muslim adults in Israel, and
found that while religiously observant Jews and Muslims are generally consistent with each
other in their assessment of the seriousness of offenses, secular Jews and Muslims are
inconsistent. Sergio Herzog, Religiosity and Perception of Crime Seriousness by Jewish and
Muslim Respondents in Israel, 24 DEVIANT BEHAV. 153 (2003). For example, secular
Muslims viewed shop robbery and apartment burglary as less serious than either secular Jews
or religiously observant Muslims or Jews, but secular Jews viewed drug selling and illegal
abortions as less serious than either secular Muslims or religiously observant Jews or Muslims.
On the other hand, Muslims regard wife assault and tax evasion as less serious crimes than
Jews, and among Muslims, the religiously observant actually regard wife assault as less
serious than secular Muslims. Id. at 163.
148

A study of Jewish male prisoners in Israel, where there is a clear division of the Jewish
population into secular and religious groups, found that only 3.7% of Jewish inmates were
religiously observant compared to about 20% among the general population. Sarah BenDavid & Leonard Weller, Religiosity, Criminality and Types of Offences of Jewish Male
Prisoners, 14 MED. & LAW 509 (1995).
149

Religiosity reduced all forms of aggression as well as victimization to physical
aggression among girls, and reduced verbal and indirect aggression but not physical
aggression among boys. Age was the primary factor in reducing physical aggression among
boys. Jewish girls of Eastern (primarily Middle Eastern) origin displayed more aggression
than Jewish girls of Israeli and Western origin, but among boys ethnic origin made no
significant difference. Simha F. Landau et al., The Effect of Religiosity and Ethnic Origin on
Direct and Indirect Aggression Among Males and Females: Some Israeli Findings, 28
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Netherlands by Junger and Polder of 12 to 17-year-old boys from four ethnic groups
—Moroccans, Hindustanis, Creoles (Surinamese) and Dutch—did not support the
notion that membership in a moral community reduces delinquency.150
A pair of multinational studies using the same data reached different conclusions
about the relationship between religiosity and crime. Church attendance correlated
negatively with tax fraud acceptability in 24 of the 37 nations,151 particularly in
nations in which over 50% of the population is religiously affiliated, but in Japan
religiosity showed no relationship to tax fraud acceptability. Among residents of
India and China, self-defined religiosity, but not formal religiosity, had a significant
though weak relationship with the unacceptability of tax fraud.152 Yet, in a different
study, frequency of prayer or meditation among Chinese respondents correlated
positively with approval of buying stolen goods, failing to report a hit and run
accident and drug use.153 The latter study, however, did not distinguish between
respondents who consider themselves to be affiliated with a moral community and
actively participate, and those who do not.
AGGRESSIVE BEHAV. 281 (2002).
150
The authors used a three-factored scale of religiosity that included a question about
attendance at the family’s place of worship and questions about parental prayer and parental
religious attendance. Marianne Junger & Wim Polder, Religiosity, Religious Climate, and
Delinquency Among Ethnic Groups in the Netherlands, 33 BRIT. J. CRIMINOLOGY 416 (1993).
While religiosity did affect delinquency within the moral community of Moroccan Muslims
living in the Netherlands, the same was not true for Turkish Muslims or for Hindus from India,
yet religiosity did reduce delinquency in the predominantly-secular Dutch Christian
population. Thus, in what one would expect to constitute moral communities of Turkish
Muslims and of Hindus from India, religiosity was not linked to compliance with the law.
Others studying this issue, however, have criticized the use of children as subjects due to their
uncertain religiosity. See Harold G. Grasmick, Karyl Kinsey & John K. Cochran,
Denomination, Religiosity and Compliance with the Law: A Study of Adults, 30 J. FOR SCI.
STUDY RELIGION 99-100 (1991). Many children attend religious services because their parents
want them to rather than out of personal religious commitment. Turkish, Surinamese and
Hindustani children living in the Netherlands appear to be more assimilated and from better
educated families than Moroccans—26% of the Moroccan children in the study had lived in
the Netherlands less than five years, compared with 12% among the Turks and 11% among the
Surinamese, and 37% of Moroccan fathers never went to school compared to 11% of Turkish
fathers in the Netherlands. Immigrant parents, less assimilated than their children, may
compel them to attend religious services in an attempt to preserve a connection to their
homeland rather than out of religious conviction. The Junger-Polder study loses force as a
consequence. Even if the study had used adult subjects, religious dress and observance of
religious dietary laws and holidays would have been better criteria for measuring Muslim
religiosity than mosque attendance.
151

Steven Stack & Augustine Kposowa, The Effect of Religiosity on Tax Fraud
Acceptability: A Cross-National Analysis, 45 JOURNAL FOR THE SCI. STUDY OF RELIGION 325,
347 (2006).
152

Id. at 346.

153

Stark, a co-author of the original Hellfire and Delinquency study, speculated that this
correlation might have something to do with the fact that the religious sector in China is
largely government-controlled and infiltrated, so that persons willing to acknowledge religious
practice, except for a few brave souls, might tend to be unsavory characters. Rodney Stark,
Gods, Rituals, and the Moral Order, 40 J. FOR SCI. STUDY RELIGION 619, 624 (2001).
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Among Christians, alcohol abuse has no statistically significant relationship to
religiosity in any denomination.154 Religious homogamy, where spouses share
religious affiliation, and frequency of church attendance are both inversely related to
domestic violence.155 Parental religiosity reduces delinquency among the adolescent
children of conservative Protestants if both parents share their religiosity, but this
effect is significantly reduced if only one parent self-identifies as a conservative
Protestant.156 However, the same study found adolescent boys generally tend to join
in delinquency rather than avoid it when their parents are devoutly religious, though
adolescent girls do not display the same tendency.157
Overall, the data, though weak, suggest that delinquency correlates with
religiosity among respondents who consider themselves to be affiliated with a moral
community and actively participate, while persons unaffiliated with a moral
community will be affected more by other factors even if they consider themselves
religious individuals.158 Even this evidence is tainted by methodological problems,
including a Christian bias in most studies. Among adults, religiosity seems to reduce
delinquency and the tolerance of delinquency to the extent that (a) the individual is
affiliated with a religious community, (b) that religious community disapproves of
the type of delinquent act at issue, and (c) the delinquent act at issue is not also
resoundingly disapproved of by the larger society. However, in predominantly
Christian societies, the relationship between formal religiosity and reduction in
delinquency is more tenuous than the relationship between self-identified religious
belief and reduction in delinquency.

154
Religiosity was measured by church or synagogue attendance, self-identification as
“religious,” and membership in religious organizations. E. Wilbur Bock, John K. Cochran &
Leonard Beeghley, Moral Messages: The Relative Influence of Denomination on the
Religiosity-Alcohol Relationship, 28 SOC. QUARTERLY 89 (1987). Another study conducted in
1970 concluded that church attendance had a more dramatic impact in reducing drinking
among blacks than among white Protestants. Paul C. Higgins, Gary L. Albrecht and Maryann
H. Albrecht, Black-White Adolescent Drinking: The Myth and the Reality, 25 SOC. PROBS. 215
(1977).
155

Christopher G. Ellison, John P. Bartkowski and Kristin L. Anderson, Are There
Religious Variations in Domestic Violence?, 20 J. FAM. ISSUES 87 (1999).
156
Mark D. Regnerus, Linked Lives, Faith, and Behavior:
Influence on Adolescent Delinquency, 42 J. FOR SCI. STUDY
Regnerus measured religiosity by three criteria: attendance at
affiliation (conservative Protestant vs. all others), and whether
“very important” or “not very important.”
157

Intergenerational Religious
RELIGION 189, 200 (2003).
religious services, religious
subjects considered religion

Id. at 200.

158

Stack and Kposowa found that among religiously-affiliated individuals, religiosity,
measured both by frequency of religious service attendance and by what they called “intrinsic
religiosity,” had a significantly stronger negative relationship with tax fraud acceptability than
among non-religiously-affiliated individuals. Stack and Kposowa, supra note 151, at 347.
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C. Motivational Law’s Unfortunate Successes
1. Motivational Law, Authoritarianism and Repression
While it is common wisdom that “institutionalizing the rule of law [is] a
precondition to democracy,”159 institutionalizing the rule of motivational law can
have the opposite effect. Compelled by law to read censored news and propaganda,
participate in mass rallies, and attend Hitler Youth meetings, the citizens of Nazi
Germany were regimented through motivational law. Surrounded by co-religionists
doing and saying the same things, members of cults are susceptible to authoritarian
control and indoctrination. In the close-knit Mormon community of 19th century
Utah, Mormon motivational laws on church attendance and on the treatment of and
respect for church leaders preserved community cohesion but also reinforced the
Mormon community’s exclusionary policy towards blacks for over one hundred
years.160
A similar dynamic can be seen in urban gangs, which one might call “immoral
communities,” in which criminal acts may be viewed positively as a way to elevate
an individual’s status within the group. Institutionalizing the rule of law may be a
precondition to democracy, but where the rule of law can also reinforce the
totalitarian tendencies of a moral community, in which case institutionalization
merely makes the misapplication of the rule of law more powerful.
Motivational law is a morally neutral tool that can propel a community or a
nation toward authoritarianism. Authoritarian regimes use censorship laws to
motivate citizens to comply with their dictates.161 Nazi laws requiring “Aryan”
children to join the Hitler Youth served a motivational purpose of ensuring their
indoctrination and obedience. Islamic laws on hijab (modest dress for women) are
motivational laws that exist to motivate men to obey laws forbidding adultery and
molestation of women, but women who refused to conform to the stringent rules of
the Taliban theocracy on the wearing of the burqa were flogged regardless whether
they were genuinely at risk of being adulterers or inspiring others to molest them.162

159

Robert Eli Rosen, Complicating Law’s Legitimation Processes, 25 LAW & SOC.
INQUIRY 973, 977 (2000).
160
In 1863 Brigham Young pronounced it the “law of God in regards to the African race”
that if a white Mormon man had sex with a black woman, “the penalty under the law of God is
death on the spot. This will always be so." G.D Watt & J.V. Long, The Persecutions of the
Saints-Their Loyalty to the Constitution-The Mormon Battalion-The Laws of God Relative to
the African Race, 10 J. OF DISCOURSES DELIVERED BY PRESIDENT BRIGHAM YOUNG, HIS TWO
COUNSELLORS [sic], THE TWELVE APOSTLES AND OTHERS 104–11 (1865). Mormon religious
law excluded blacks from the priesthood and temple ordinances until 1978, when church
leaders claimed to have received a “revelation from God” discontinuing the practice. Spencer
W. Kimball N. Eldon Tanner & Marion G. Romney, 148th Semiannual General Conference of
The Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-Day Saints, Official Declaration 2 (Sept. 30, 1978),
available at http://scriptures.lds.org/od/2.
161

See supra note 41.

162

Women in Afghanistan: The Violations Continue, AMNESTY INT’L, Oct. 30 1978,
available at http://web.amnesty.org/library/pdf/ASA110051997ENGLISH/$File/ASA1100
597.pdf (“In December 1996, Taleban[sic]-controlled Radio Voice of Shari’a announced that a
group of 225 women had been rounded up and punished in Kabul for violating Taleban[sic]

Published by EngagedScholarship@CSU, 2008

37

148

CLEVELAND STATE LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 56:111

Authoritarian regimes standardize and ritualize163 motivational laws into a talisman
of power.
Because religions tend to use motivational law to achieve compliance, one might
predict that extremely religious individuals would display authoritarian tendencies.
Adorno164 attributed several characteristics to the authoritarian personality, among
them conventionality, intolerance of deviance, a desire to utilize state power to
suppress nonconformity, distrust of human nature, belief that man is inherently evil,
a belief that strong authority is needed to keep men’s evil drives in check,
submissiveness to authority, and repressed sexuality coupled with a preoccupation
with sex. Religion and Adorno’s description of the authoritarian personality overlap
in certain respects; for example, religions tend to adopt strong notions of
conventionality and to be intolerant of deviance.165 Religions also tend to advocate
submissiveness to authority; indeed, the word “Islam” means “submission,” referring
to submission to Allah.

rules on clothing. The radio announcement warned women once again to wear the burqa and
respect the Shari’a (Islamic law) or `face punishment’. Sources state that punishment of the
225 women consisted of being lashed on the back and legs after the sentence was handed
down by a tribunal enforcing the Taleban[sic] interpretation of Islamic law. . . . On at least one
occasion, such punishments have taken the form of bodily mutilation. A woman in the KhayrKhana area of Kabul in October 1996 was reported as having the end of her thumb cut off by
the Taleban[sic]. This ‘punishment’ was apparently meted out because the woman was caught
wearing nail varnish.”). The tendency to ignore the motivational purpose of hijab and regard
it as a talisman is not confined to Taliban Afghanistan or the Iranian theocracy. The debate
within the European Union regarding hijab reflects confusion about the motivational purpose
of hijab in Islam as well as the assumption that the motivational purpose is pretextual and that
hijab has been hijacked by fundamentalists in Europe as a political symbol. If hijab were
regarded merely as a set of rules of modesty intended to motivate Muslims to resist the
temptation to commit adultery or engage in premarital or extramarital sex, rather than as a
declaration of identity as an Islamic fundamentalist, it is doubtful that it would have elicited
such strong reactions. “[T]he very construction of hijab issues as those of ‘religious identity’,
sustained by the use of Article 9 ECHR as the primary legal basis for such cases, has given
shape to a number of counterproductive trends. These are: deference to local knowledge
(either the national courts’ or the school’s); obfuscation of Muslim women’s agency; explicitly
antagonistic counter-positioning of the ‘conflicting priorities’ of ‘cultural diversity’ and
‘gender equality’; and, less obviously, the moralistic fervour enfolding the debate.” Anastasia
Vakulenko, Islamic Dress in Human Rights Jurisprudence: A Critique of the Current Trends,
7 HUM. RTS. L. REV.719 (2007).
163

I use the term “ritualized” in the sense in which it is used in the study of neurobiology
and animal behavior, to refer to the evolution of a routine functional behavior into a signal or
symbol. See Sir Julian Huxley, A Discussion on Ritualization of Behaviour in Animals and
Man, 251 PHIL. TRANSACTIONS ROYAL SOC’Y LONDON 249 (1966).
164

THEODOR W. ADORNO, THE AUTHORITARIAN PERSONALITY (1950). Adorno’s work has
been exceedingly influential despite criticisms from both the right and the left. See, e.g., J.J.
Ray, The Old-Fashioned Personality, 43 HUM. REL. 997 (1990); J.J. Ray, Why the F Scale
Predicts Racism: A Critical Review, 9 POL. PSYCH. 671 (1988); John L. Martin, The
Authoritarian Personality, 50 Years Later: What Questions are There for Political
Psychology, 22 POL. PSYCH. 1 (2001).
165

See J. Keith Abrams & L. Richard Della Fave, Authoritarianism, Religiosity, and the
Legalization of Victimless Crimes, 61 SOC. & SOC. RES. 68, 70-71 (1976).

https://engagedscholarship.csuohio.edu/clevstlrev/vol56/iss1/6

38

2008]

MOTIVATIONAL LAW

149

Consistent with this prediction, studies have found a strong correlation between
authoritarianism and religious fundamentalism.166 As among studies of religiosity
and delinquency, the Christian bias problem crops up in many of the studies, but a
study of non-Christian subjects reached similar conclusions.167 However, studies that
have examined the relationship among authoritarianism, Christian religious
fundamentalism, and prejudice168 also have found that if authoritarianism is factored
out, religious fundamentalism actually has an inverse relationship with prejudice. In
other words, non-authoritarian religious fundamentalists tend to be less prejudiced
than non-authoritarian people who are not religious fundamentalists, while
authoritarian religious fundamentalists tend to be more prejudiced than authoritarian
non-fundamentalists.169
2. Cults and Concealment
Motivational law seems to work most effectively in communities that use it
pervasively, but membership in an insular moral community held together by
pervasive motivational law also confers a degree of anonymity and immunity vis-àvis the outside world, and an incentive to protect the community by concealing
wrongdoing.170 Such communities are susceptible to authoritarianism in their
operation, and easily become cults.171 In cults, motivational laws become central to

166
Bob Altemeyer & Bruce Hunsberger, Authoritarianism, Religious Fundamentalism,
Quest, and Prejudice, 2 INT’L J. FOR PSYCHOL. RELIGION 113, 118 (1992) (defining
“fundamentalism” as a style of belief that is characterized by a militant belief system, a sense
of one absolute truth, and a sense of a special relationship with God); Bruce Hunsberger,
Religious Fundamentalism, Right Wing Authoritarianism, and Hostility in Non-Christian
Religious Groups, 6 INT’L J. FOR PSYCHOL.. RELIGION 39 (1996); L. Wylie & J. Forest,
Religious Fundamentalism, Right Wing Authoritarianism and Prejudice, 71 PSYCHOL. REP.
1291 (1992); Brian Laythe et al., Religious Fundamentalism as a Predictor of Prejudice: a
Two-Component Model, 41 J. SCI. STUDY RELIGION 623 (2002).
167

Hunsberger, supra note 166.

168

The studies have focused on both racial prejudice and homophobia. Studies regarding
homophobia, like those regarding racism, have found right-wing authoritarianism to be related
to prejudice. Christopher R. Stones, Antigay Prejudice Among Heterosexual Males: RightWing Authoritarianism as a Stronger Predictor than Social-Dominance Orientation and
Heterosexual Identity, 34 SOC. BEHAV. PERSONALITY 1137 (2006); Wayne W. Wilkinson,
Religiosity, Authoritarianism and Homophobia: a Multidimensional Approach, 14 INT’L J. FOR
PSYCHOL. RELIGION 55 (2004); Jo-Ann Tsang & Wade C. Rowatt, The Relationship Between
Religious Orientation, Right-Wing Authoritarianism and Implicit Sexual Prejudice, 17 INT’L J.
FOR PSYCHOL. RELIGION 99 (2007).
169

Laythe et al., supra note 166, at 624.

170

Brietzke, supra note 112, at 350.

171

I use the term “cult” to refer to religious sects that are characterized by the following:
(1) The sect demands total commitment from its followers, claiming all of their time, energy
and thoughts and regimenting daily existence. (2) The sect subordinates its followers to the
authority of its leaders. (3) Sect members are isolated from non-sect members, often living in
a remote location and being cut off from outside communications.
See Note,
Conservatorships and Religious Cults: Divining a Theory of Free Exercise, 53 N.Y.U. L. REV.
1247, 1250-51 (1978).
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members’ existence, with much time being consumed by ritual and other practices
intended not only to motivate members to adhere to religious law, but to adhere to
the law of the leader in matters of daily life.
The evils of pervasive motivational law in religion are not limited to cults. The
problem of domestic abuse within the ultra-Orthodox Jewish community has largely
gone unaddressed, though not unnoticed.172 Catholic priests who abused boys
enjoyed immunity for years from the government and from civil liability, yet the
religious laws governing the priesthood should have made them highly vulnerable to
shaming. They were able to persist in their abuses only because some in the Church
hierarchy chose to keep the abuses a secret, placing avoidance of collective shame—
the reputation of the Church itself—above duty to the victims or their responsibilities
under secular law.
The tendency of motivational law to coincide with authoritarianism and
concealment has structural underpinnings. Motivational law can generate an
organizational infrastructure the complexity of which corresponds to the complexity
of the motivational laws themselves. Complex prayer services and rituals require
people to organize, administer and lead them, to train others to do so, and to decide
issues that arise in the course of applying the motivational laws that mandate and
govern them. A well-organized and well-financed religious group has the means to
take effective action vis-à-vis other populations. If motivational laws work
effectively within that group, the group’s organizational capacity can be energized
and turned to extreme forms of action.
Religious educational systems may elevate the risks of pervasive motivational
law. Major religions including Islam, Judaism and Catholicism have spawned
elaborate systems of religious education, necessitated by the complexity of their
religious legal systems, including motivational laws. For Muslim children to learn to
apply the Qur’an, Sunnah, ahadith and fiqh is a full-time task, as it is for Hasidic
Jewish children to learn to pray in Hebrew and to apply the Tanach, the Talmud and
the medieval codes and commentaries. The need to learn complex motivational laws
and practices contributes to the isolation of observant children from the mainstream
of secular life.
Pervasive motivational practices also contribute to the marginalization of
Muslims and Orthodox Jews when they live as a religious minority among people of
different religions. Muslim women who wear hijab such as the Iranian chador and
Afghan burqa,173 and traditional Orthodox174 Jewish men who wear yarmulkes and
172

For a lengthy bibliography on this issue, see Marica Cohn Spiegel, Bibliography of
Sexual and Domestic Violence in the Jewish Community, http://www.mincava.umn.edu/
documents/bibs/jewish/jewish.html#id2354008 (last visited Nov. 6, 2007).
173
Hijab is an Arabic term that refers to modesty in dress, including obligatory head
coverings for married women. See Mary C. Ali, The Question of Hijab: Suppression or
Liberation, in THE INSTITUTE OF ISLAMIC INFORMATION AND EDUCATION BROCHURE SERIES,
available at http://www.usc.edu/dept/MSA/humanrelations/womeninislam/whatishijab.html.
The chador, a Farsi word, is a full-length semicircle of fabric, usually black, with a head
opening traditionally worn by women in Iran. The burqa is similar to a chador but has a mesh
that covers the face. See A Good Life: Lifting the Veil (Radio Netherlands Worldwide
broadcast Jan. 21, 2003), available at http://www.radionetherlands.nl/features/development/
burqa030123.html.
174

There is a movement within Orthodox Judaism called “Modern Orthodoxy” in which
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black hats and ritual fringes (tzitzit), do not assimilate easily into secular society in
the West. The frequent obligatory prayers—five times a day in Islam, three times in
Judaism—also distinguish adherents of these religions from their peers in the
workplace or wherever they may be when the time arrives for prayer. In turn,
because they remain marginalized populations—often immigrants, and ethnic and
religious minorities—Muslims and Orthodox Jews are more likely to maintain their
traditions and observe motivational laws, but motivational laws also keep them
marginalized.
3. Ritualization and Standardization
Motivational law easily can become ritualized, in the sense that it assumes nonmotivational functions that displace or are substituted for its original motivational
purpose.175 Ritualized motivational law both exerts resistance to social change and
can engender or exacerbate social, and even international, tensions.
In a theocracy, ritualization creates an impetus toward standardization. Where
religious authorities control the coercive power of the government, line-drawing to
decide whether motivational law has been violated becomes more critical since the
decision now determines the administration of punishment. Motivational law not
only takes on new functions but is standardized.
The wearing of hijab, for example, serves as a symbol of religiosity in Turkey,
but in Iran it symbolizes allegiance to the existing Islamic political regime, enforced
by religious police. In such cases, ritualized motivational law on hijab slows the
pace of social and religious change, becoming an instrument of oppression, yet may
also inspire resistance among women who resent having what elsewhere is a
motivational device forced upon them. It also becomes necessary to prescribe what
constitutes hijab. In drawing lines, religious authorities, confronted with ambiguity
regarding a commandment thousands of years old, tend to build what one Talmudic
authority referred to as a “fence” around the divine rule;176 hence the burqa and
chador become mandatory.
Observance of motivational laws also takes on secondary meaning where
religious identity is related to social status. Often the same practices that are
intended to engender motivation to comply with regulatory religious law are also the
most visible to the world outside the moral community. Indeed, their very visibility
can be necessary to their effectiveness as a motivator. One Jewish rabbi avoids
“road rage” because the kippah—skullcap or yarmulke—on his head makes him “a
representative of the Jewish people” and causes him to control himself.177 Similarly,
Sikhs wear the “five K’s” to keep themselves under control, including kesh (uncut
hair wrapped in a turban), kanga (ritual comb), kaccha (special underwear that is
supposed to engender self-control), kara (a steel slave bangle to remind Sikhs to

adherents sometimes eschew the required head coverings and other motivational practices. I
use the term “traditional Orthodox” here to distinguish this movement.
175

See supra note 163.

176

THE BABYLONIAN TALMUD, Pirkei Avot (“Ethics of the Fathers”), 1:1. The original
language is, “Build a fence around the Torah,” meaning to err on the side of being overly strict
in case of ambiguity regarding a Biblical—or in Islam, Koranic—commandment.
177

Rabbi Alan Lew, quoted in ROSENBERG, supra note 2, at 38.
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remember the Guru before taking action), and kirpan (a dagger to remind Sikhs to
defend the weak against oppression).178
A scene in the film Europa, Europa179 illustrates the relationship between
motivational law and social status. A Jewish boy passing himself off in Nazi
Germany as an Aryan member of the Hitler Youth tries to reverse his circumcision to
avoid detection. The circumcision, originally a Biblical motivational law which like
the commandment to wear ritual fringes180 was intended to remind Jewish males to
keep God’s commandments,181 became in the Third Reich a deadly mark of inferior
social status.
Because observance of the requirements of motivational law is frequently the
most visible manifestation of religious practice, such observance can mark the fault
lines of religious conflicts, even where many members of the groups in conflict do
not share in that observance. Muslim men with full beards attract more hostility
from bigots than Muslim men who are clean-shaven and wear suits. Recent antiSemitic caricatures of Jews182 often portray them wearing a kippah or hat, a full
beard,183 and sometimes, a ritual shawl (tallit) with fringes (tzitzit); observance of
motivational law makes Jews targets.
V. A THEORY OF THE EFFICACY OF MOTIVATIONAL LAW
A. Conditions for Motivational Law to Improve Compliance with Regulatory Law
Motivational law seems to perform well as a motivator of compliance with
regulatory law only if two conditions are met: (1) either the motivational law itself is
enforced by sanctions and threat of sanctions sufficiently severe to have a deterrent
impact or the motivational law is consistent with the self-interest of those being
regulated,184 and (2) the linkage between the motivational law and regulatory law is
evident to those persons who are supposed to comply with the motivational law.
Failure of either condition can cause a failure of motivational law to achieve
compliance with regulatory law.
178
See generally BBC—Religion & Ethics—Sikhism: The Five Ks, http://www.bbc.co.uk/
religion/religions/sikhism/customs/fiveks.shtml (last visited Oct. 29, 2007).
179

EUROPA, EUROPA (Central Cinema Company 1990).

180

See supra notes 34-35.

181

See the discussion formerly available at http://www.jtsa.edu/community/parashah/
archives/5761/lekhlekha.shtml.
182

See, for example, those collected by Tom Gross, Cartoons from the Arab World,
http://www.tomgrossmedia.com/ArabCartoons.htm (last visited Nov. 6, 2007). See also JOËL
KOTEK & DAN KOTEK, AU NOM DE L'ANTISIONISME: L'IMAGE DES JUIFS ET D'ISRAËL DANS LA
CARICATURE DEPUIS LA SECONDE INTIFADA [IN THE NAME OF ANTIZIONISM: THE IMAGE OF JEWS
AND ISRAEL IN CARICATURE SINCE THE SECOND INTIFADA] (Éditions Complexe 2003).
183
Traditionally observant Jewish men, like Muslim men, grow beards. Ultra-Orthodox
boys wear payos, forelocks.
184

In terms of cognitive dissonance theory, individuals must first establish a commitment
to the behavior required by motivational law. Unless they have a predisposition to that
behavior, they will not establish the necessary commitment without compulsion by the threat
of sanctions. See supra Part III.B.
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The examples given earlier in this Article of motivational laws that fail to
accomplish their purpose can be explained by failure of one of these conditions. For
example, there is no punishment associated with making a gratuitous promise. The
risk of punishment for violating obscenity laws is mild at best, given the difficulty of
prosecution,185 and those who produce or perform in pornography typically see no
connection between their conduct and rape or sexual abuse.186 Violations of religious
motivational laws in Western democracies carry no penalty other than a divine one
that has credence mainly among those who would comply with those laws anyway.
Punishment for violating military disciplinary rules is far more certain, but the
linkage between obeying a rule to keep one’s bunk neat or to salute a superior officer
and overcoming fear of death to obey an order to advance on the battlefield may
seem tenuous to many soldiers. If a debtor fails to obtain a briefing on available
credit counseling before filing a bankruptcy petition, the debtor’s bankruptcy case
can be dismissed, but a 2006 study of credit counseling funded by the Consumer
Federation of America and American Express and conducted by professors from
Georgetown and Purdue Universities found an increased likelihood of a subsequent
bankruptcy or derogatory public record among people who obtained credit
counseling compared to others with the same credit bureau risk scores who did not
obtain credit counseling.187
If these two conditions are satisfied, on the other hand, motivational law can act
as a stepping stone to, or reinforcement of, compliance with regulatory law.
Typically, violations of motivational law are regarded as less egregious and are
punishable by lesser sanctions than regulatory law. For instance, a teenaged boy in
Nazi Germany would not suffer quite so severely for failure to comply with a law
requiring his attendance at Hitler Youth meetings—a law aimed at motivating him to
submit to the military training and indoctrination to obey orders that the Hitler Youth
organization administered—as he would for disobeying an order once he was drafted
and put on the battlefield. The flogging of women in Taliban Afghanistan and
Ahmadinejad’s Iran who fail to comply with a version of hijab mandating that they
185

Melanie Pearl Persellin, Note, Sticks and Stones May Break My Bones, But Your Words
are Sure to Kill Me: a Case Note on United States v. Alkhabaz, 50 DEPAUL L. REV. 993, 1038
(2001) (“In general, obscenity prosecutions are quite rare due to the difficulty in establishing
material as obscene under the Miller test . . . .” (citing Blake T. Bilstad, Obscenity and
Indecency in a Digital Age: The Legal and Political Implications of Cybersmut, Virtual
Pornography, and the Communications Decency Act of 1996, 13 SANTA CLARA COMPUTER &
HIGH TECH. L.J. 321, 370 (1997))).
186

One article quotes adult video producer Veronica Hart, “I’m not sending out the
message to a bunch of guys that it’s okay to go out and abuse chicks because that’s what they
really want. . . . Even when the chick wants . . . to be taken by a bunch of guys, it’s very clear
in my movies that it’s her wish.” Sean Hannon Williams, The Parallel Trends of Increased
Adult Content in Mainstream Media and Harder Core Pornography: A Tale of Market
Failure? 1 THE CARCERAL NOTEBOOKS 61, 71 (2006) (emphasis in the original), available at,
http://www.thecarceral.org/pornography.pdf.
187
MICHAEL E. STATEN & JOHN M. BARRON, EVALUATING THE EFFECTIVENESS OF CREDIT
COUNSELING 25 (May 31, 2006), http://www.consumerfed.org/pdfs/Credit_Counseling_Report
061206.pdf, (last visited Nov. 14, 2007) (“[E]ven after controlling for risk scores at the outset,
the regression model estimates . . . indicate that those who visited a counseling agency had an
increased likelihood of a subsequent bankruptcy or derogatory public record.”).
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completely cover themselves in order to avoid arousing men to entice them into
adultery or to commit rape or sexual abuse, is far less severe than the supreme
punishment meted out to women who commit adultery, and in the perverse logic of
fundamentalist Islam, women often are blamed, and punished severely, even for their
own rape and abuse.188
B. The Allure of Motivational Law as “Regulation Lite”
Motivational law often fails to improve compliance with regulatory law, yet
lawmakers nevertheless find it alluring.
Lawmakers commonly perceive
motivational law as a stepping stone to compliance with regulatory law, as
“regulation lite.” It is a way to improve the odds of securing compliance with
regulatory law by compelling people to engage in behavior by which they remind
themselves of their obligations under regulatory law, or by developing a habit of
complying with a class of commands that includes regulatory commands of a similar
form or emanating from the same source of authority.
Motivational law not only is perceived as heightening the odds of compliance
with regulatory law; it also is less onerous and subjects people to lesser punishment
in case those commands are not obeyed. It is both easier and less risky to compel
soldiers to attend drills in which they are trained to obey orders, and to fine them or
confine them to quarters if they don’t show up, than it is to shoot them if they
disobey an order in battle.
Yet, motivational law also provides cover in case of a failure of regulatory law.
A municipal legislator wishing to appear tough on rape and sexual abuse may
propose an anti-obscenity ordinance, then when the incidence of rape and sexual
abuse remains high, point to it as evidence the legislator took action. In religious
communities, a defrauder may maintain a reputation for righteousness by virtue of
his compliance with the laws of his religion on religious dress, diet and ritual, or by
coming to church every Sunday, using as camouflage motivational laws that are
supposed to motivate him to obey religious and secular laws that require honesty.189
188

See Asifa Quraishi, Her Honor: An Islamic Critique of the Rape Laws of Pakistan From
a Woman-Sensitive Perspective, 18 MICH. J. INT’L L. 287, 288-90 (1997) (according to
fundamentalist Islamic doctrine, absent four male eyewitnesses to a woman’s having been
raped, the victim is presumed to have had consensual sex out of wedlock, making her an
adulteress (zina) subject to punishment by imprisonment or the death penalty); S. Douki et al.,
Violence Against Women in Arab and Islamic Countries 6 ARCHIVES WOMEN’S MENTAL
HEALTH 165, 165 (2003) (attributing indifference to domestic abuse in Islamic countries to
“attitudes that domestic violence is a private matter and, usually, a justifiable response to
misbehaviour on the part of the wife.”); Manar Waheed, Note, Domestic Violence in Pakistan:
The Tension Between Intervention and Sovereign Autonomy in Human Rights Law, 29 BROOK.
J. INT’L L. 937, 946 (2004) (“any disobedience or even rumor of disobedience is enough to
dishonor a man and killing that symbol of disobedience will restore a man’s honor”).
189
In one case in the 1980s handled by the author’s law firm, a businessman made a stir in
his local Jewish community by pledging, in a very public forum, a million dollars for Israel.
Using the reputation for uprightness he had gained by seeming to comply with Jewish laws on
tzedakah (charity), he convinced many members of that community to invest in a limited
partnership of which he was general partner. The limited partners later discovered the
partnership was insolvent and that the businessman had misappropriated partnership funds.
Finally, they learned the businessman had never honored his million-dollar pledge for Israel.
Then, and only then, did they sue him.
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Both because enforcing motivational law is less onerous than having to enforce
regulatory law and because it cloaks a lawmaker with the appearance of having tried
to improve compliance with regulatory law, lawmakers often use motivational law
even in contexts in which there is little or no evidence that it actually works. I have
discussed several examples—obscenity laws appear to have little effect on the
incidence of rape and sexual abuse of women, the requirement of consideration for
contracts does not prevent people from making contracts that they don’t really intend
to perform, the credit counseling requirement for consumer bankruptcy does not
seem to make debtors more likely to honor their contractual obligations in the future,
and compliance with religious rules on church attendance has only a marginal effect
on the incidence of violation of criminal laws among church-goers. Yet, in each of
these cases, those who make and construe the law have opted to use motivational
law.
Despite its limited efficacy in most cases, motivational law holds particular
appeal among religions, which generally use it more extensively than secular
authorities.190 Lacking the power to punish adherents through formal sanctions in
most cases, religious authorities rely heavily on rules regarding religious liturgy and
ritual, dress and diet both to reinforce moral communities and to motivate people to
comply with religious regulatory laws.191 These rules, however, have much more
powerful impact in contexts, such as most Islamic countries, in which motivational
law is enforceable through sanctions imposed by the state.
C. Motivational Law’s Innate Conservatism
Motivational law is inherently a conservative force. Codifying motivational
practices and enforcing them with sanctions makes them difficult to change. As
discussed above,192 motivational law functions in part through reinforcement of the
moral community in the face of modernity and rapid social change. People are more
easily motivated to comply with rules that are consistent with existing norms and
practices. When motivational law is employed to alter existing norms or to attempt
to motivate people to comply with the commands of an authority that is otherwise
regarded as illegitimate, it usually functions poorly, unless enforced by strong and
credible sanctions as in cults. For this reason, motivational laws often have
secondary meaning, identifying those who comply with them as supporters of the
status quo within the moral community or reference group.
This conservatism is rooted in part in the cognitive tendency to idealize the past.
People tend to rate past events more positively than they rated them when the event
occurred (“rosy retrospection” or the “positivity effect”).193 People also tend to
190

Use of motivational law in religion has ancient roots. See supra Part II.B.3.

191

See supra Part II.A, for the distinction between motivational and regulatory laws.
Religious regulatory laws include, for example, most of the Ten Commandments, and other
rules governing the relationship between people and between people and their environment.
192

See supra Part IV.C.3.

193

Terence R. Mitchell & Leigh Thompson, A Theory of Temporal Adjustments of the
Evaluation of Events: Rosy Prospection & Rosy Retrospection, in 5 ADVANCES IN
MANAGERIAL COGNITION AND ORGANIZATIONAL INFORMATION PROCESSING 85, 85-114 (Chuck
Stubbart et al. eds., 1994); Mara Mather & Laura L. Carstensen, Aging and Motivated
Cognition: The Positivity Effect in Attention and Memory, 9 TRENDS COGNITIVE SCI. 496

Published by EngagedScholarship@CSU, 2008

45

156

CLEVELAND STATE LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 56:111

remember their choices as better than they actually were (“choice-supportive
bias”).194
Most of the examples of motivational law given in Part II.B of this Article
manifest this conservative tendency. Obscenity laws, laws prohibiting abortion
counseling, credit counseling requirements for bankrupt debtors, laws establishing
the privileges of royalty, military disciplinary rules, and censorship laws all reflect
conservative values. Motivational rules of the common law requiring formalities
such as consideration or seal of the promisor for a binding contractual promise, the
holographic will in lieu of witnesses, and the formalities of Roman civil law such as
those required for the fiducia cum creditore195 that are still reflected in the secured
credit laws of many civilian jurisdictions,196 seem quaint relics of the distant past
though they remain in use today. Efforts to use motivational law to rehabilitate
offenders have been only marginally successful,197 perhaps because they attempt to
use a tool best suited for preserving normative behavior to alter the behavior of
people whose norms are different.
Motivational law’s conservatism also manifests itself in religion. “Give me that
old time religion” is sung in many Protestant churches. Hasidic Jewish movements
continue to require their members to dress in the manner of 17th century Eastern
European Jews, and practice a version of Jewish liturgy from the same period. Al
Qaeda and its affiliates motivate their followers to commit acts of what they call

(2005).
194
Mara Mather & Marcia K. Johnson, Choice-supportive Source Monitoring: Do Our
Choices Seem Better to Us as We Age?, 15 PSYCHOL. & AGING 596 (2000).
195

George Long, Mancipium, in A DICTIONARY OF GREEK AND ROMAN ANTIQUITIES 727
(William Smith ed., London, John Murray 1875), available at http://penelope.uchicago.edu/
Thayer/E/Roman/Texts/secondary/SMIGRA*/Mancipium.html; George Long, Fiducia, in A
DICTIONARY OF GREEK AND ROMAN ANTIQUITIES 536 (William Smith ed., London, John
Murray 1875), available at http://penelope.uchicago.edu/Thayer/E/Roman/Texts/secondary/
SMIGRA*/Fiducia.html
196

See Arnold S. Rosenberg, Where to File Against Non-U.S. Debtors: Applying UCC §9307(c) [Rev] to Foreign Filing, Recording, and Registration Systems, 39 UCC L.J. 109, 25557 (2006).
197
See, e.g., Doris Layton MacKenzie et al., An Experimental Study of a Therapeutic Boot
Camp: Impact on Impulses, Attitudes and Recidivism, 3 J. EXPERIMENTAL CRIMINOLOGY 221
(2007) (explaining that boot camp releasees had marginally lower recidivism than releasees
from prison, and the difference became insignificant when antisocial attitudes or anger
management problems were added to the model predicting recidivism); James A. Wilson &
Robert C. Davis, Good Intentions Meet Hard Realities: An Evaluation of the Project
Greenlight Reentry Program, 5 CRIMINOLOGY & PUB. POL’Y 303 (2006) (stating that
intervention participants performed significantly worse on multiple measures of recidivism
after one year); Sheldon X. Zhang & Lening Zhang, An Experimental Study of the Los Angeles
County Repeat Offender Prevention Program: Its Implementation and Evaluation, 4
CRIMINOLOGY & PUB. POLICY 205 (2005) (stating that juvenile offenders provided with
treatment showed lower recidivism rate than control group only for the first six months after
release); Margaret P. Spencer, Sentencing Drug Offenders: The Incarceration Addiction, 40
VILL. L. REV. 335, 378 (1995) (“The field of intermediate sanctions is relatively new and there
is no proven successful sanction for low-level drug offenders.”).
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martyrdom in the struggle to restore the 7th and 8th century caliphate, which they
regard as a divine command.
VI. CONCLUSION
Motivational law exists, and prevailing theories of law do an inadequate job of
explaining it. Motivational law often lures lawmakers as an alternative or
supplement to coercive enforcement of regulatory laws, but without enforcement of
the motivational law itself through sanctions or threat of sanctions, it is unlikely to
succeed in increasing compliance with regulatory laws. Even with enforcement
through sanctions or threat of sanctions, motivational law will fail if its linkage to
regulatory law and favorable outcomes is perceived as weak by those who are its
subjects. When motivational law does work, it works primarily by establishing a
commitment to compliant behavior and strengthening the moral community,
allowing peer group influence to reinforce that commitment.
Inherently a conservative force, motivational law is susceptible to abuse by
authoritarian regimes, which use censorship laws and forced indoctrination to
consolidate their power. However, motivational law acts as a conservative force in
the common law tradition as well, reflected in such doctrines as the consideration
requirement for contract formation, the rule against admissibility of evidence of
subsequent repairs, and the formalities to make a will. Even due process has a
motivational purpose: to maintain the legitimacy of the judicial process so as to
motivate citizens to accept and obey the judgments and orders it produces.
Religions in democratic countries, lacking coercive power, often use motivational
law, though Christianity, a faith-based rather than law-based religion, makes less use
of it than Islam and Judaism. This disparity in use of motivational law lies at the
core of tension between Islam, rich in motivational law rendered rigid in theocracies
through ritualization and standardization, and the predominantly Christian secular
democracies. Religious motivational laws, such as church attendance and religious
ritual, dress and diet, must be either enforceable through sanctions or clearly
connected to favorable outcomes for those to whom they apply, or they will atrophy.
Once individuals are committed to religious observance, however, both shaming and
the information processing described by cognitive dissonance theory, screening out
information that fails to support that commitment, will tend to preserve religious
observance.
New Governance theory and “soft law” similarly rely on motivation mediated
through regulatory communities. Regulatory communities, however, give the
impression of cronyism. When government regulators develop a bond of trust with
the industries they regulate, outsiders distrust them for it, and the government’s
legitimacy suffers. To the extent that it relies on motivational law not enforceable
through sanctions, New Governance may decay into cronyism and will damage the
legitimacy of the regulatory process.
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